April 7.
IL is somewhat dificult at the moment to perceive the exact implications of the Japanese protest to M. Litvinoff concerning the use of Soviet planes in support of the Chinese armies. It is apparent that considerable damage was done to the Chinese air force in the early days of the hostilities, and it was only to be expected that the Chinese Government would do everything within its power to repair the damage done. "It naturally looked for replacements and found that a portion of her needs could be met from Russia, in just the same manner as other of her needs were supplied from other countries. There is! nothing in the present state of affairs to prevent China purchasing war material in whatever market may be open to her. Japan ai may, by naval and military means, seek prevent those supplies reaching China, but no international guilt attaches either to the purchaser or the vendor; they are both doing what they have every right to do in view of all the circumstances. It has been well Known for some months past that Russian tiers were assisting the Chinese, flying Russian planes. The suggestion has been made that an arrangement has been come to between the National Government and Soviet Russia whereby the latter had agreed to provide material_on terms which have not! been divulged. The arrangement may prove! to be an unfortunate one, but if it is, Japan has only herself to thank. While Japan had' Knowledge of the facts she did not possess proof until recently, when an aeroplane was shot down and one of its occupants, a Russian, was captured and brought to Shanghai. That amounted to proof upon which the Japanese! Government considered it advisable {o render the strong protest which has been registered with the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, The gravamen of the complaint appears to be of that Moscow has been supplying acroplanes 10 China, but that they, or at least some of them, are being flown and fought by Russian citizens.
Litvinof in rejecting the protest denied all knowledge of the pilot who had been taken prisoner. That is to be taken as a diplomatic denial only, for on the known] facts concerning conditions in Russia it is impossible to believe that the Russian aviators} who have left their own country to fight for} China did not do so with the full knowledge and consent of the Soviet Government. may even be that they did so on direct orders. Should that prove to be the case their status] is somewhat different from those men of other nationalities who have volunteered to} serve China in the alr. The Japanese spokes man in Tokyo makes it quite plain that that is the belief of the Tokyo government, for hho alleges that it has become clear that the Soviet Government "sent officers and soldiers] ta China in order to have them join directly)
the operations of the Chinese." Colour is ent to that contention by the information which has reached Shanghai from Hankow to the effect that the Russian flying contingent} maintains its identity as an independent unit, having no relations with the other portions of the Chinese air force, and, from all accounts, aceepling 10 orders except from superiors of their own nationality. That places _the Japanese protest in somewhat different light.
not a protest so much against individual Russians flying Russian machines for the Chinese, but the operation of what amounts toa Russian unit in assisting the Chinese air} forces. It may be a very small unit; reports suggest that to be the case, but in view of in Russia, the compleic government maintains over the actions of it people, the Japanese may be forgiven if they assume that these men in fact represent a military unit despatched to help the Chinese. That in their yes would' amount to military intervention on the part Russia, and when it is understood that the! Japanese' have protested on what to them must appear to be a matter of principle the! reason for their action becomes the more apparent.
Tt remains to be seen what step Japan can next take following M. Litvinofi's rejection of the protest. The spokesman in Tokyo is quoted by Domei as saying that "such patched up explanations by the Soviet Government! fare now out of the question." If that means} anything at all, and it is doubtful whether it does, it must mean that Japan will be prepared to take action against Soviet Russia. That does not st the moment look likely. The Japanese have just about as much as they can handle in China without indulging in other and) very: extensive commitments. Overt hostilities would have two effects. One would be to} engage huge Japanese forces in Manchoukuo ud perhaps in Mongolia, while Moscow would then undoubtedly make common cause with China and supply her with war material fon an even greater scale than she has up to the present. Tt would pay her to do so, for the more Japanese forces held in China the less available in the north. That would) not serve Japan's interests, for as the struggle progresses in Shantung and along the Lunghai Railway it is being demonstrated that the Chinese have been fighting with just the same determination as they did around Shanghai, and that the Japanese forces have not yet Succeeded in attaining that ascendency which should give them early victory. At the same time it is very doubtful whether the Japanese will do more than register their protest.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.