The Archive · 1934

THE WAY OUT?

Mar.

Ironically enough the official white paper containing the British Memorandum on Disarmament has just reached Shanghai, Making due allowance for the unknown factors which may be at work to justify Mr. Stanley Baldwin's recent deprecation of an immediately adverse verdict, it seems that nothing but a miracle can avert from Mr, Eden' mission the stigma of failure The telegrams now to hand seem to make the Memorandum patpatiealty, shadowy, although it is to be hoped that what it describes as its' main objective—the maintenance of peace—will not be forgotten, Special emphasis indeed might at this moment Jald on the following passage in the Memorandum:

Even though increase of armed strength may. be actuated by:

Reason of defence, it is an index of fear of attack from another "quarter, and a. measure of the alarm ud disquiet existing between peoples. Conversely, a moral agreement securing the tation of armaments at the lowest practicable level would be the most effective and significant proof of international' appease: ment from good and neighbour.

relations." Consequently, Majesty's Government regard agreement about armaments not end in itself, but rather 5 4 concomitant of "work ence and as an outcome of political amelioration, Even if the Disarmament. pro-Posals should be shelved, as seems more than probable, these principles will have to be borne in mind, sooner or later by any civilization which seeks to preserve its integrity. It is time for the various nations to take heed to the sinister portents aflame inthe international sky. boots not to apportion blame for the weakening of international confidence, Perhaps no single nation can be acquitted of the charge of having contributed to that breakdown, although certain specific phases and certain. definite actions may afford texts for homilies on the subject. T! veal question is whether ti! obviously dangerous tension now marking European relationships does not impel responsible statesmen to take a broad survey of the Whole situation with a view to radical adjustment, the controversies particularist bearing are brushed aside and the problem of European peace be assessed on general lines, it becomes apparent that the gradual deterioration has sprung directly from the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, So long as the defeated signatories to that, Treaty were unable to make their objections—_effectivel: heard, its weakness was concealed from view. Yet under the Covenant of the League there exists. machinery for revision which, as the years have passed, has become all the more urgent. It is open, of course, to certain signatories to declare that revision cannot be contemplated. They have to take into account the pratming bélsous now evident! in Centra) Europe.

Rosser evil than revision, they must be granted that dubious} privilege, but the trouble is that the burden of claiming that privilege may fall but lightly on their shoulders. In other words their choice of war might, in the absence of exceedingly' adroit statesmanship, involve even [those nations who are means hostile to revision. The fundamental weakness of the Versailles Treaty is not that it contains a "war-guilt" clause; that is an emotional inaccuracy which has served to present a basic truth in popular form. The real charge against 1 Treaty is that it dictated a peace to Germany. It is presently irrelevant to the issue to assert that Germany, if victorious, might have fallen into the same error, indeed might have imposed even fiercer terms. The fact remains that the Treaty's effect ness as a permanent guarantee of peace could be maintained only by compassing the complete destruction of Germany. France and her allies were confronted by it with the impossible task of eternally sitting on the head of their defeated foe. The Treaty should have been framed, as, on rare occasions, treaties in the past have been framed, by a free Jand equal discussion of its terms by all parties. Men cannot be wiser than their generation, $0 this view is not expressed in criticism but rather in dispastionate assessment, This must be said for the dictators: they inserted in the Covenant of the League certain provisions which even now can be used to avert the dread cataclysm so fearfully discerned ahead.

France, in just apprehension for her security, is clinging to those armaments by which her membership of the League seems be stultified, Germany's mood, changing from sullen des-Pair to rising exaltation, is favourable to no measure of Jdisarmement which ignores. the militant spirit of her present revival, Herr Hitler's pacific avowals are regarded with grave suspicion, His personal sincerity may be undoubted. Equally clear is the force of the demand for re-avenge animating those whom his Imagnetic personality has united a solid national front, To both these tortured nations caught in the toils of elemental passion, the British Memorandum must appear a "hollow mockery. The time seems to have come when France's security which cannot be guaranteed by anyone except France herself will have to be sought. on other lines. The danger to that security is not so much the aggressive design of Hitlerist Germany (with the Junkers in the ba ground) but the resentment which prompts it. Here is the opportunity, for the League. Under the Covetiant, the revision of the Versailles Treaty can discussed and carried into effect, with Germany—on return to the League—sharing in the task. The maze suggestion would perturb, as it has already perturbed, '7 the countr h owe their new territorial cance to. that Treaty.

It is even asserted that their answer would be immediate hostilities, Europe has now to consider the balance of advantages: will her statesmen have the courage to face and provide for the legitimate claims of the hew states or will they allow the situation to drift until the major feonflagration which may. conce mean the death of modern civilization, breaks out to their fatal discomfiture? This presents a black picture; yet, beside the tale of ever-quickening return to the old competition in armaments, it irresistibly takes its place. In the name of security and because of the breakdown in the peace machinery of international leompact, nations may logically defend their revival of the ery of "preparedness". Still, there can be, in no one's mind, the slightest doubt of the ultimate outcome. The only question is whether it will be in this decade or that, whether indeed the effort of delay can eventually be transformed into that movement for political amelioration to which the British memorandum, as quoted above, to pertinently refers. But that move-peace out of the inflammable If they are ment can successfully be direct-' material of war-mongering.

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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