After having carefully examined particulars of the proposed. Eastern Pact, the German Government to-namely' Germany, the Soviet Union, [Polsnd, Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonis, Finland, and Czechoslovakia should {support' one another militarily lease of war. Moreover, the Soviet Union is to guarantee the Rhineland Locarno Pact and France give antee for the Eastern Pact.
The whole system necessitates that member states should belong to the League of Nations. In its observations on this project, the German declared that its fundamental view was that it could see no possibility of becoming a party to such jan international treaty system as long as its claim toa state of equality in the matter of armaments is still doubted by certain Powers. [The same view point prevails in the Jewestion of Germany's future rela tion with the League of Nations.
As to the proposed obligations render military support to the other signatories, the German Government states that the realization of the provisions of the Covenant concerning sanctions had met with insuperfable dimeulties in -all international Germanys' central position in the midst of a number of powerfully-inned states compels special caution Jand precludes the possibility of taking over any obligation which would make her a party to all cases of con-ict in the east and in all probability would make Germany herself the scene of the war. Furthermore. there exists no real political need for the special guarantees provided for in the pact aystem by France and the Soviet: Union. In any case, Germany cannot expect any advantages from such guarantees.
The German "Government believes that other methods for te mainten-Jonce of peace promise better pros pects of success. Generally speaking {the German Government would pre-for two-Power agrements but definitely declines to be party to [multilateral treaties. Moreover, the essential feature of such two-Power treaties must not be the obligation {to automatically render aid in case lot the outbreak of war but the solemn obligation not to attack and the simultaneous preparedness to. lenter into consultation with the Powers concerned In a conflict, Such obligations would readily tend themselves to the establishment of real peace guarantees by assuring the provision of friendly measures to [prevent the outbreak of war without their involving the danger of serious Jcomplications, as would certainly be the case with the multiple, mutual Jaid pacts now proposed by the [Powers—Trans-Ocean Kuo Min.
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