June 6.
The introduction of the Essential Commodities Bill into the House of Commons is to, be taken as nothing more than prudent' provision against emergencies and by no means justifies the belief that such emergencies any nearer now than they have been during the past few years. Indeed it may be safely hazarded that they are more distant now than. they have been for a long time. Nevertheless the experiences of the last war clearly proved that one of the principal forms of preparedness is concerned with the adequate supplies foodstuffs, forage for animals, fertilizers and petroleum. It is clear that the Government is determined that the United Kingdom. shall never again run the risks of blockade similar to those which the German submarines} 89 nearly completely established during the Great War. It is for that reason that the provisions of the Bill are described as precautionary rather than preventive, for it is clear that while stored supplies cannot prevent a blockade—only efficient naval action can do that—the storing of supplies against emergencies will serve to cover the time lag between any new development in the art of naval blockade and the devising of means wherewith to combat it, Thus it is not proposed to equip the British Isles with' sufficient stores to withstand a seige, but rather to insist upon means of keeping the sea-lines open, always with the proviso that! a situation might arise in which the existence of reserve supplies immediately available! would be a sufficient insurance against any temporarily untoward development in certain' phases of naval warfare. Sir Thomas Inskip has clearly stated the intention of the govern ment when he said "We do not want stocks to withstand a seige, but to carry us over a period of trade disturbance, interruption in shipping and the possible destruction of stocks at ports." It is, of course, difficult to estimate what length of time would be required to overcome the disadvantages arising out of any of the dislocations which he envisages, though itis suggested that the general policy provides ample time for the restoration of the supplies: of essential foodstults.
If there is any particular criticism to be levelled against the Government's essential foodstuffs programme as at present developed, is to be found in the fact that the scheme contemplates the creation of a number of huge stores where such goods might be preserved] against the outbreak of trouble. The danger of such a practice is that the larger such warehouses and their districts, the larger the] targets offered to a possible enemy, and where under the new concept of war it is desirable to strike immediately at the civilian popula tion behind the forces in the field or on the: seas, the destruction of such stores, or the dislocation of the means of distribution might very reasonably be one of the first objectives of ihe enemy. It Is inevitable, perhaps, that such goods as those which the Government has already admitted purchasing should be more or less centrally stored, but there is a larger aspect of the question of food storage against emergency which does not appear to} have received the attention it should. If it] is admitted that wholesale centralization of} foodstuff reserves present attractive targets to an enemy, then the doctrine which it seems} must be adapted is one of decentralization. That cannot be carried out in its entirety, but there is a large number of foodstuffs of 2 not)
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.