The Archive · 1939

BREAKERS AHEAD

Next week will in all probability be one of the crucial periods which it seems likely the world is to pass through during this year if present prognostications hold good. The rapid development of the situation in Spain will it is thought induce activities on the part of both Germany and Italy, where already certain signs of preparation for grave events are reported, and when Herr Hitler makes his speech on Monday, the world may possibly be brought to a realization that another crisis is in the offing. February has for a long time been fixed upon by political observers as a month likely to give trouble, and it is thought that Herr Hitler will start the ball rolling with his Reichstag speech. In it he is expected again to raise the demand for the return of the German colonies, and it has even been suggested that a further demand for the return of the reparations which Germany has already paid will be formulated. That, of course, is a matter of speculation at present, but it has been reported that some weeks ago he gave instructions for such a scheme io be prepared. There is also the question of what Der Fuehrer intends to do with regard to his eastern European policy, and with regard to him, the rest of Europe knowing that some demand is going to be made, speculates as to which will be the first. On the other hand, Italy is preparing to make her demands, concerning Djibuti, Tunisia and participation in the control of the Suez Canal, it being now suggested that, with regard to Tunisia, Il Duce will demand autonomy for the 95,000 Italians living there, a strange request in view of the fact that only about three years ago Signor Mussolini was prepared to see them eventually become French citizens by a slow process of transformation. These facts emerge out of a large number of rumours concerning other cross currents which make the whole situation somewhat difficult to disentangle, and it is with these demands which have already been adumbrated that Mr. Chamberlain is apparently first concerned.

In the event of the Franco-Italian tension deteriorating, it is thought that Germany will propose to Great Britain that both shall maintain an attitude of neutrality, leaving those two nations to fight it out between themselves, but it is by no means clear that any such proposal will be acceptable to the British Government which cannot now afford to ignore public feeling in the matter. That is probably the reason for the rumour that Mr. Chamberlain is reported to be contemplating calling a Four Power Conference. If indeed he is doing so in all probability it arises out of his recent visit to Rome, where it is reported Signor Mussolini made the same suggestion. It is extremely doubtful at the moment whether, if such a conference were held, it would have any really beneficial effect. Any meeting at which Germany, and Italy expect to be the takers, and Britain and France the givers will be doomed to failure from the outset, for it has been made quite clear since Munich that neither of the latter Powers intend to adopt any such role. Rather will they expect that both Germany and Italy shall in their turn make some concessions in the interests of peace. That has been made quite clear, and unless these two nations are prepared to go into conference with the realization that the only lasting basis of peace is in the nature of a compromise acceptable to all the four Powers concerned, then the conference will from the outset be doomed to failure. It is to be hoped that the rumours that Mr. Chamberlain proposes to take the initiative concerning the calling of a Four Power Conference will not prove to be correct. To do so at this juncture would be to convey an impression of weakness wholly inconsistent with the interests of Great Britain and France, and it would be preferable that the initiative should come from either Germany or Italy, or both. The history of the past year has shown that the more that is granted to those two nations the more they will demand, and recent months have shown that at the moment, despite whatever assurances have been given, there is no finality to their requirements. In the circumstances it would seem to be more desirable that the desire for a conference should be expressed by Germany and Italy who should be expected at the same time to detail the agenda to be considered, and the limits of their demands. Then and then only will be it possible to decide whether any such conference had any prospects of success, and if it had none, no such meeting should be held. An abore tive one at this time would be disastrous.

Whether a crisis is to be precipitated early next month or not, only Der Fuehrer and Il Duce at present know. The world at large will probably know more about it all early next week, though Herr Hitler is such a man of surprises, that, following former precedents which he has established, he may say nothing of importance next Monday. The equanimity with which Mr. Chamberlain accepted the German notification of their intention to build submarines up to a tonnage parity with Great Britain is indicative of the increasing firmness with which he is handling matters, for it is now an lapon secret that he was informed of the matter three weeks before he divulged it, maintaining reticence at the German request only until he realized that even Italy had not been informed of the German intention.

The refusal of the British Government to be flurried over the matter is the best indication of the present access of strength in British foreign policy, and it is more than possible that in the coming months the Rome-Berlin axis may find itself opposed with a firmer Entente Cordiale than was the case throughout last year. That this will increase the immediate danger of the situation is as inevitable as it is regrettable. But that is a danger which will have to be faced courage ously. Appeasement has not up to the present succeeded; there is very little chance of its doing so, even if it led to a general (Surrender to the German-Italian demands, for it has been shown that with them it is a case of the appetite growing with eating. In the circumstances for Mr. Chamberlain to be the prime mover in calling a Four Power Conference would be taken as a sign of weakness, a weakness which it is apparent no longer exists, and, if such a conference were held, and proved to be a failure because of the stiffening of the Anglo-French Point of view, the second state of Europe would be infinitely worse than the first, and this war which is now regarded as a probability would fast become inevitable.

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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