Tur Causes or mee Wono War An Bioen. "ae la Boiotneque uistorieal "Summary by "Comi Stu Muste de in Grande Guerre, Profeseur Ata" Sorbonne. "As At the present time this book is exceptionally valuable. Based German and Austrian documents "{t a severely historical analysis of the causes of the World War. The author expresses no opinions on his Jown account. The only personal opinions in the narrative are those of two German writers, Eugen [Fischer and Hermann Lutz, because }M." Bloch considers that these two writers—both of them deeply and sincerely patriotic—as members of the committee set up by the German Reichstag to investigate the causes of the War, carried out their {task with the utmost possible his-{torieal exactitude. Their views, therefore, are taken to offer the soundest' guarantee of sincerity, without offending any national sus Jceplibility or scruple. The book fwritfen for the student and layman ike, $0 the bibliography and notes: are carefully published at the end order to keep the narrative free from interruptions. So the layman obtains, in simple language on whick [the translator is to be congratulated, a plain, straightforward account, in 100 odd pages, of the essential diplomatic and' political facts leading up to the fatal breaches.
When people to-day talk about the inevitability of war, they should really study this remarkable document. It proves that in the summer of 1914, war could have been avoided. But William I of Germany and the -German General Staff, although they had maintained a peaceful attitude during the Balkan wars, were fully aware of the unpreparedness of France, Russia and England. They believed that the moment for aggression hot come and seized the first fevourable opportunity to adopt the polley of force. Encouraged by Berlin, Vienna was inclined to attack' Serbia at the risk of pro-yoking European. complications. Austria-Hungary was, therefore, the spearhead of the aggression. It was on the advice of the German Government that the ultimatum to Serbia was sent, with the clear tntention "of making negotiation impossible. With this object in. view, the Entente Powers' request for an extension of the time limit, granted to Serbia was rejected. Similarly, the British proposal for a confer-fence of ambassadors of states not Sirectly interested in the conflict was rejected by Germany: tently negative and manifestly ageres-'Sve policy of the Central Empires was 'Causing the Brith Government grave Snxdety, brought the strongest pres-Sure to best on Berchtold in order to ebiain some concession from him which would allay Sir Edward Grey' Suspicions. But no sooner hed he sent! Instructions im thie sense, to. his am-Bassador in Vienna than he canceled them, and thus himself put am end diplomatic action, This seems to. have been the turning point which made war almost inevitable, and from the! Gocuments at the disposal.of historlans, the author maintains that two facts emerge:
tndleation is to be found that, but for the steps concerted between the Vienna and Berlin Governments, land Dut for Berlin's encouragement or will be no disposition on art of anyone to-day to dlsterrible error in terms of censure or recrimination. The plain facts are there and from them must be deduced the opinion that as long as the considerations which were shown to govern the actions fof the Central Powers are held be followed by nations to-day, 50 Tong will those nations expose' not only themselves but the rest of the world to perhaps an even more catastrophic destruction of the re-Sources of civilization—am.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.