He goes on to say that sincè the crisis of last September it has become clear that on the outbreak of hostilities war risk would be covered largely if not wholly by Governments, the insurance markets contributing their Organization and technical capabilities, and, perhaps, accepting a fraction of the risk as a guarantee of efficient management, This, in his opinion, would bring complete relief to underwriters fcr what he calls the "shock period," by Which he means the period imme diately following the outbreak! hostilities when nations will en your by intensified attack to cripple the overseas commerce of th enemies.
At such a time the attacking force would be at its maximum, while the defence er efficient, would be at the disadvantage of having to cope with surprise tactics and would not have learnt how to counter the tech-unique of the attackers.
Mr. Froelich points out that if "shock period" could be sury underwriters could recoup th by adjusting their rates to circumstand s they developed, but e dently he is of the opi devastating losses mi Then, again, if Governments step im at the outbreak of war, underwriters would be deprived of the means of recouping their losses by subsequent premiums without being relieved of the very heavy losses probable during the "shock period His solution is that the Governments should assume an adequate of war risks current at the out k of war, and he suggests that underwriters should enter into negotiations with their Governments in order that the necessary arrangements can be made before an emergency arises.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.