daly 23.
While it Is reported from Japan that public opinion on the subject of the latest Manchoukuo incident is improving, and the possibility of war rather more remote than it has been for some days past, the reports of the interview between Foreign Commissary] M, Litvinoff, and Mr. Shigemitsu, Japanese 'Ambassador to Moscow, suggest that the outlook is not yet at all bright, M. Litvinoff rejected the Japanese"demand for the Russian' withdrawal from the hills near Hunchun, the occupation of which by the Soviet troops was the cause of the present dispute, claimed that according to a Russo-Chinese treaty of 1869 the territory in question was on the Russian -side of the border, and- declared that the Zetrength of troop movements in Soviet territory. was a_matter which concerned only. the Soviet Government which. could not tolerate any interference by a foreign Power. "In reply to this-very forthright presentation of the Soviet side, Mr, Shigemitsu was equally' emphatic. He expressed the conviction that 'M, Litvinoff's reply would not satisfy the Japanese Government, since it was based upon a map which had never been published, and that, unless measures were taken for! restoring order on the frontier, the Japanese Government might, be compelled to come to the conclusion that the application of force' was necessary. Whether the Japanese' Ambassador was merely bluffing or not time alone will show, but it apparently had no immediate effect upon the attitude of the Russian Foreign Commissary who pointed out that the validity of-Japan's secret treaties was not affected by their non-publication, and the implied threat of Mr. Shigemitsu, Litvinoff made a reply which varies according to the different news agencies. According to one version M. Litvinolf $s reported to have stated that "It is hardly possible to think that the Japanese Ambassador considers such threats good diplomacy. Some Governments may give in to such threats, but he must understand that he will not find any success in applying this method to Moscow." Obviously, from a diplomatic point of view the two nations could hardly be any farther apart, and the situation in Moscow, on the face of it, does not justify the impression in Japan that' the situation is improving.
Litvinoff appears to be on sound ground! {in his contention that the fact of publication or non-publication has no effect upon the validity of a treaty, and if the boundary is outlined as alleged in the Russo-Chinese Treaty of 1869, and there has been no ins strument, between the parties concerned, varying it since, then'the Russian claim to the hills which her' troops have occupied must. be good. The question may be profitably asked as to why, if Russia's case is as good as it is, claimed, she has failed to make it until this Tate date. There may be a number of reasons, not the least of which might be that Moscow was content to wait until it was strong enough to protect its claim, and that degree of strength has already been reached. If that is indeed the reason, then the only issue remaining seems to be whether Japan is prepared to go to war to protect the alleged rights of the independent state of Manchoukuo. It is true that Korea has some interest in the modification of the boundary at this point, but it is a very minor one, and not such as should necessitate Japan resorting to hostilities. There no question of the ability of the Japanese to send forces into Manchoukuo sufficient to fight the Soviet armies. She undoubtedly has the men and material to ensure such armies giving a good account of themselves, but is by no means certain that Japan would obtain a victory, or that if she did it would be at an expense wholly disproportionate to the importance of the questions involved. If, however, the Hunchun incident is regarded merely as the proximate cause, and that the main idea behind the Japanese attitude is the settlement once and for all of the many other and. important issues outstanding between Russia and herself, then. a complete victory, even if an expensive ore, might not be wholly unprofitable, as has reports of, what Dr. Benes: and his Government are to contribute towards the [general settlement of the issues involved are fuct such as tq encourage the "hope that a settlement in the near future is within the bounds of probability... 'The. conclusion *is very. dificult to escape: that: the. process of arriving "at, a compromise between'. the extremes of what the Sudeten Germans-have demanded and the "extent to. which the [Czechoslovakian Government is prepared to g0, will have to be just as prolonged and {tortuous as the -original complexity. of" the problem foreshadowed. There have been a small guarantee. towards, the. continiang of peace; for the weaker the, anti-Kominie partnership 4s. the less likelihood is there any breach; of the peace, which: Herr himself {s'now. quoted as'belng/most.ansiog to maintain, 5
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.