Aprit is but natural that there should be eon-siderable speculation concerning the pro-ress of the Anglo-Russian negotiations for something which it is believed may turn out to be a military wnee designed for the purpose of adding to the sure of mutisal defence which his been ishing rapidity since Czechoslovakia, There has bee objection (o the receipt of military aid from Russia by Poland, which is determined that Soviet soldiers shall not encroach upon Polish territory, thous! this docs not, so it would peat, preclude Russia from giving that assistance in the air, which should sers change the balance of air power in Europe immediately, and most certainly some th before the full effect of Br r Fearn ment comes fully into play. The major points, which it is reported are under con sideration in London and Moscow, include a Soviet guarantee to Rumania, to which Mos~ cow is reported already to have given ay verbal acceptance, British guarantees to Poland, Rumania and Turkey. The geners effect of such an arrangement would be that the western borders of Russia will be ade~ quately guaranteed, for, if the antinaggres~ sion pact operates in favour of Poland and -Rumania, than it would be impossible for Germany to move against Russia without taking such steps as would automatically bring the anti-aggression understandings into. operation. If to this is added a general agreement between Great Britain and Russia, providing for mutual reciprocation, amounting to a full military alliance, it will be seen that, should present Anglo-Russian_parleys end'in the success which is hoped for, a striking change will have been brought about in European international relationships may have a profound effect upon future developments. It should not be thought that, such an arrangement would destroy all fear of another war, though it may very considerably reinforce beliefs at present held as to what would be the result of such a struggle.
If Great Britain and Russia do reach agreement on the points under discussion, it will merely mean that a return has been made to the doctrine of collective security, originally destroyed by German action, and now again brought into being by the behaviour of that self-same country. There wi ably be many in Britain, who will stil! look Upon an Anglo-Russian ' alliance considerable disfavour. There is a strong body lion which holds that, if Britain ideologies respectively represented by Germany and Italy on the one hand and Russia on the other, would choose the former. That o is not, however, so strongly held as. to. prevent Great Britain seeking strange bedfellows, and the world may be somewhat bewildered by the rapidity which (chillis adapting its policy to swiftly wing times. Much has been made of! Fecent military purges in Russia as tending, to weaken that country's military machine. There is still the uncomfortable fear that the removal. of too many of the higher officers in the Red army may have led to a deteriora tion of its military effectiveness. That is 3 possibility which should not be overlooked, but as, judging from the manner which developments are shaping, there is litle likelihood of "anything but Russia's air force being used in Europe, too much weight need not be given to this particular aspect of the matter." With the adherence of both Russia and Turkey to the proposed untisaggression pact this portion of British policy will have achieved complete success. The union of all the nations, likely to be most closely affected by the German and Mahan schemes for territorial aggrandisement, in a determination to oppose it to the bitter end may be termed by Germany a policy of encirclement. It is quite clear that the effects of that encirclement need never bbe felt so Tong as those two nations retral from that aggression to which it is at present feared they are contemplating to resort. In its essence, being purely defensive, it need give ho rise for more anxiety, than docs Entente Cordiale in times of peace.
There is, about these reports of 1 possible' Anglo-Russian military alliance still. many questions which can only be answered when the terms of whatever understanding is Yeached are published. Not the least interesting Hem for speciation is as to what Would be the effect of sich an ayrecment unpen the situation in the Far East. It should be quite obvious that an Anglo-Russian military alliance designed merely to meet the European situation would be most one sidedly in favour of Britain and France. Moscow insists that the understanding shall be all-embracing then her position in the Fur East will be very considerably streni= thened. But then so also would that of Gr and France. Thus no matter how ble this Anglo-French-Russian may be to some people it is ent that it is the only possible answer to the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis which can be evolved in present circumstances. counsel of perfection would ko the inclusion of the United States in such an sr: angement. That, however, seems hardly 10 be with the bounds of practical polities, though with the "strong American disapproval of the methods followed by the two European dictators, and the very real moral support of the demo by the United States, the absence of that country from partnership in any stich coalition of states need not in itself be ay in certain circumstances tum out to be an added strength. But for the moment the greatest attention must be centred upon the Europe: effects of an Anglo-Russian alliance com with that between France. ind Russia. to make the decision which he has to by April 28. By that time it ix to be hoped that Moscow and London will have reached a complete and published eyreement. Should so it may serve very greatly to modify what at present appears to be the common. policy ler and Mussolini
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.