It was urged on hig behalf that the agreement of June 4 was not clear in its terms and that the Court should look dehors the Instrument for the true meaning thereof. Extrinsic 1ce (which was received condi-Honatily on its being. subsequently held' to be. admissible) had shown that the word "entitled" in the tenth clause of the agreement meant "obliged": otherwise there was no consideration moving from the plaintiff. In order to arrive at de-Tondant's understanding of the agency agreement, "the compradore agreement should be taken into considera don, under clauses 3 and 9 of which the compradores had (o put up $2,000 every month for the factory. The plaintiff was entitled to compel the compradores to do this and by his failure to do so. had throught about the wbreaeh of which he complained and could not recover (Addison's 11th Ba. p. 146; Mayne on The de-been foreed into action by' necessity: he warned the plaintiff of this but ihe latter did nothing to help him, Alternatively, the contract was oppressive and unreasonable and an unnecessary restraint of the de-Tendants trade (Addison's Contracts, 95; Leake on Contracts, p. 528): oF Void on the ground that it was vague, obscure and unintelligible (Addison Pp. 46; Leake p. 400; 7 Halsbury Sia)
Meaning Intended The broad canons of the construction of documents may be briefly stated: the construction must reasonable, liberal and favourable, words must be construed in their ordinary sense and the whole context considered. If it is possible to put two constructions on an agreement—one which would make it iMegal and vold and the other which would not, the latter view must be taken. The contract is, If possible, to be sup-Ported and a construction avoided Which would render any portion of it nugatory or meaningless. Benigne faciendae sunt interpretationes char-arum ut res magis valeat quam per eat, "The language of the instru ment is to be understood In Its ordinary and natural meaning and evidence may not be received to show that the language was intended 10 be used by the parties with any other than such meaning; in other words, it fs of no consequence what the tention of the contracting parties was their written agreement, though {otally Inconsistent with such intention, is precise and clear. In Shore Wilkow (1842, 9 El. & F. 565)
Tindal C. J. said: "The generat rule take to be that, where the words of any written instrument are free from ambiguity in themselves, and where external elreumstanees do not create any doubt or difficulty as the proper application of those words to claimants under the instrument oF the subject-matter to which the strument relates, such instrument always to be construed according to the strict, plain, common meaning of the words themselves; and that, in such ease, evidence dehors the instrument, for the purpose of explaining It' according to the surmised OF alleged intention of the parties Is utterly inadmissible." An even more Iueld exposition was recently given by Hilvery J. in British and French [Corporation Ltd. v. New Brunswick Railway Company. Tt was, he said, canon of construction" that the Words of a contract must, if possible, be given their natural meaning. The friction of the Court was to find and to give effect to the intention of the parties in accordance with the Tanguage which the parties had selected. If from the surrounding Cireumsiances in which the contract fros made, or through other things fwhieh were expressed tu the contract Tiselt"the. words. of particular clause could "not be given their nee toral" and-ordinary meaning. the Gourt would give. them "meaning consonant. with the other expressions the eoniract and. with the. elt= cumstances. surrounding the making fof the contract. very contract is 10 be construed with reference. to Us beet and the whole of its terms on which the preamble will often throw Tight. "Chitty on Contracts, 17th Ed,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.