The Japanese advance on Hankow is producing some interesting features not the least of which is the manner in which'the Japanese command has driven a narrow salient into the Chinese positions, along the Yangtze River. If the Chinese posts on both sides of the river ate joined into one line it will be found that a wedge no more than about sixty-two miles wide, between Tatung on the south bank and Tungcheng some distance in on the north bank, and about one hundred and thirty miles long from Tatung to Matow has been driven westward along the low-lying land north and south of the river. Generally the Chinese appear to have resorted to the mountain system near both banks, while at the head of the wedge are the hills west of the Poyang Lake a narrow strip of flat land between the north bank and Kwangtsi, one of the immediate objects of the Japanese forces in order to obtain access to the highway running thence towards Hankow. Taking the action as a whole the Japanese have, for the monient, no intention of striking into the mountain system which is considered the main prop of the Chinese defence of Hankow, and appear'to be content with operations calculated io turn the Chinese positions on both sides of the river. Thus on the south bank the Japanese columns operating out of Singtze and Mahweilung are working down the Kiukiang-Nanchang Railway in the narrow strip Between the mountains and the lake, with Tehan as the immediate objective, with Nancháng ultimately in mind, whence by a movement westwards, still on comparatively flat ground, the Japanese apparently hope to urn the position which the Chinese have established in the hills. To the north a similar manceuvre is apparently under way. Striking originally from Hofei in Anhwei, thence to Huan, the Japanese ultimately reached Yehkiatsi, whence they are pushing on towards Shangcheng, while another column has reached Wulungmiao and is progressing towards Kashih. Shangcheng and Kashih are of importance as being at the ends of two highways which join at Kwangchow, running westwards to Sinyang on the Peiping-Hankow Railway the cutting of which is one of the main objectives of this movement.
The most direct path of the three already mentioned, so far as reaching Hankow is concerned, is that along the north bank of the Yangíze. On the map the mountains south of the river should enable the Chinese to withstand any attempt to advance simultane oonsly with the movement on the other bank, but there comparatively flat land Between the river and the foothills offers the Japanese an opportunity of advancing from Kwangtsi, once that has been captured, along the highway. The river itself would be the chief means of communication, though in this respect it has to be remembered that there are at least three booms across the Yangtze which would have to be removed before the waterway would be open to the Japanese navy and supply ships. Progress along this route has certain disadvantages, not the least of which would be the lengthening of flanks north and south of the river, with the continual threat of the substantial forces which the Chinese have in the mountain systems, and with which the Japanese may have some difficulty in dealing. It is considered probable that before committing themselves to further progress in this direction, requiring the use of considerable forces to maintain their own flanks, the Japanese will seek to turn the whole position north and south of the river, in the hope of bringing the pinchers to bear and forcing a wholesale Chinese withdrawal. Thus, with a distance of over 200 miles between Nanchang in the south, and Kashih in the north, it is apparent that the Japanese will have to make very considerable progress westward from both points before anything like sufficient pressure can be brought to bear upon the Chinese defence of Hankow to bring about a wholesale collapse. That, however, would be more true if there were some degree of equality between the equipments of the opposing forces, but at the moment the disparity is so great that possibly the most appropriate parallel would be in the defencelessness of the Mexicans compared with the armour and horses which Cortes brought with him on his expedition of conquest. Were the Chinese as adequately equipped as the Japanese, the advance westwards from Kwangtsi would be a most risky undertaking, but as along this route mechanized transport and tanks can be used, the Japanese command probably feels inclined to take chances which in other conditions they would desire to avoid.
On the other hand a sufficient advance into Hupeh along the Yangtze northern bank, simultaneous with the effecting of progress towards Sinyang on the Peiping-Hankow Railway, might force the Chinese in that very wide salient to withdraw, and more particularly so if from that latter station the Japanese made any impressive advance down the railway. Indeed it would seem that almost at any time the Japanese may decide io ignore the Chinese positions south of the Yangtze and concentrate upon the northern portion of the salient, for so long as the Chinese force south of the river are sufficiently hell, they can be more or less completely im-Tübbilized so far as any action north of the river is concerned. At the same time progress towards Nanchatig, and the threat of a possible advance westwards should have the effect of keeping substantial Chinese forces south of the river, while the main fight proceeds along the other bank. All the distances involved are at present large, and as the crow files the nearest Japanese position, in the vicinity of Kwangtsi, is still about ninety miles from Hankow, though very much longer it the route which the river follows and which the contemplated advance must adopt is taken into consideration. As things stand at the present moment it is apparent that it is only the superiority of material which has made the Japanese movement at all successful, for when it is viewed on the map, it is quite clear that with anything approaching similar equipment the Chinese would have been able better to withstand a movement which ince the fall of Anking has become increasingly unorthodox. It seems clear that even [ithe fall of Hankow need not in the circumstances bring about the end of the Chinese resistance. The vast area which the Japanese will have to bring under control, the manifold difficulties which the terrain offers, and the undoubted bravery of the Chinese troops may create a situation in which the end of hostilities will be no nearer than peace was after the fall of Pretoria during the Boer War. Hankow can be reached and taken by the Japanese, but it cannot be considered to be completely held until all the very diffeült territory around which their forces are at present skirting has been reduced to some sort of stability. If in this the Japanese are no more successful than they have been in Other areas through which they have pro-grossed, much will yet have to be done, before these victories are anything but victories in name.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.