Sept. 1.
Desirable as it may be, it is difficult to keep away from the subject which is engrossing the attention of the whole world, and giving statesmen in Europe one of the most anxious, if not the most anxious of times they have had for practically the last} quarter of a century. Thus while the siluation with regard to the Czechoslovakian dispute appears to be clearing up to some extent, and the immediate issues becoming more! closely defined, it is realized that the avoidance of the dangers which confront Europe' depend largely upon the personal view which Der Fuehrer may eventually decide to take Of the matter, the extent of the concessions! which the Czech Goverment is prepared to! make, and the extent and nature of the outside influences upon the Sudeten Germans, fand the spirit in which the latter meet the Droposals of Dr. Hodza. That the Czech Government has decided to make further proposals involving some retreat from the Position it originally took up, is the general tenour of the latest messages. It is even stated that the revised proposals have been, Presented to the Sudeten leaders, and that the latter are not prepared to accept them. Well informed sources in the absence of! oficial pronouncements state that the Governments proposals go the length of suggesting] something in the nature of a canton system for the Sudetens somewhat analogous with that in vogue in Switzerland, while on the other hand it is suggested that what the Sudetens now require is some sort of scheme which would place their areas in conditions Somewhat approaching those governing the case of Northern Ireland. It does not seem Greatly to matter which of the two schemes ultimately proves acceptable, though it must, always be remembered that while the text Of the present dispute consists of the wrongs of which the Sudeten Germans complain at the hands of the: Czechoslovakians, the motive behind it all is the mutual desire of the former and Herr Hitler's government to be absorbed and to absorb them into the German Reich. The ultimate end of Germany and the Sudetens is anschluss, and therein is to be found the real difficulty in arriving at an amicable solution. Hence the seriousness of the situation, for Herr Hitler has to decide in the course of the next few days whether for the time being he will abandon this portion of his policy, or seek fo carry it through despite all the representations which have been made.
For that reason his forthcoming speech at! Nuremberg will be awaited with some anxiety. There are plenty of encouraging! factors in the situation which indicate that even now the scales are weighted in favour' Of @ peaceful settlement, at least for the! time being. It is inconceivable that the main body of public opinion in Germany has any} enthusiasm for war, or that even German military opinion looks to anything but a sharp struggle leading to an inexpensive victory. That view is reinforced by the very real knowledge which must by now have been borne in upon them, that with the extension of hostilities which it has now been made plain would be inevitable, any war arising out of adventures into Czechoslovakia cannot be a short one, and certainly not one of a few months for which alone Germany appears to be completely fitted. The strange! silence of the Italian Government and Press can only be read in one way. The Austrian' anschluss was an unpleasant awakening for Mahan public opinion when it realized that Germany was now at the Brenner Pass: extension into Czechoslovakia means the further growth of German influence in the Danubian basin at the expense of Italy, and consequent increase in the price which Rome has been paying for adherence to the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis. It is no wonder then that no particular enthusiasm is being] shown for the German cause in Italy. This is all the more natural when it is realized that the action of France and Great Britain is not directed against Fascism in whatever form it may exist, but is inspired by a desire to insist upon the sanctity of treaties, and to restore to the world some degree of its [former international morality. There is no reason whatever why Italy should become involved in any struggle which may eventuate—though it is devoutly hoped it will not—unless owing to commitments which have ready been made, for not only is she not in any danger from British and French Policies in this ma¥ler, but is likely to benefit from whatever improvement may be effected in the Central European situation.
The impression seems to be formed by some Germans that in the ultimate event Britain will not fight, and that the behaviour of Whitehall has been meroly a gigantic bluff. It is probable that that opinion is fathered by the desire, ut it should be apparent to any students of contemporaneous history that the last thing Great Britain would again attempt to do would be to bluff. Not only that, her commitments to France are now so definite, they have been so recently reiterated, that were Britain to fail to Keep her word, she would stand despised in the eyes of the world, and bereft of an ally from whom she cannot afford to part, There is a tendency in militarist nations to regard those, uninspired by the same sentiments, as effete and incompetent, lacking in the necessary moral strength to Aight. That idea seems to have been apparent in the minds the English rulers when the American colonists commenced the War of Inde= pendence, and, ill-equipped as they were for the struggle, fought it to a successful conclusion, Consequently it would not be merely stupid, but the height of insanity to father any such idea that at this late hour Britain might go back on her word and leave France in the lurch. Those who hold such views have not the slightest apprecia. tion of the realities of the situation and are deluding themselves with fond dreams. It does not matter how the respective roles are filled, but conditions in Europe resemble the approach of the irresistible force upon the immovable object. Should they actually come into contact the heat engendered will Undoubtedly create an explosion, Can that be avoided? The answer is' definitely aMirmative, for so long as there is no armed intervention in Czechoslovakia the forces of France and Great Britain will not move; so Jong as an opportunity is given the opposing interests in the first named to compose their differences Europe will not be forced into war. That is the situation in a nutshell, and the next moves will have to come from Herr Hitler and Herr Henlein. Upon them rei 5 the gravest possible responsibility, perla, more upon the former than the latter. determination immediately to enforce anschluss outweighs all the other consider:.- tions which are to be found in the other p. of the scales, then it must be war, a which no reasonable man wants, The only man who can decide is Der Fuehiver: th stage is set and the world waits anxious}; to know what he will do,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.