With a new session of the Council of the, League of Nations opening yesterday, it is more than likely that its deliberations will at any rate for the immediate future be overshadowed by the developments in the Czechoslovakian crisis. It is true that the League has never met under a darker sky or with more doubtful omens, but if, as is reported, M. Joseph Avenol Secretary-General of the League, told a meeting of! higher officials that the present session of the. Council is not only the most important in the history of the League, but the most vital for the world and peace, he is giving to the League an importance which its present condition does not justify. It is plain that it is in no position to play any decisive part in any of the troubles afflicting the world at the present time, and at the very best the results of its deliberations can have but a purely academic value. This is no occasion to expatiate upon the reasons for the failure of the League. They are already only too well known, and it would serve no useful purpose to deal with them again in detail, but the fact has to be admitted—whether it be merely temporary or not,—and it has to be realized that at the present moment the League has little of influence or authority which it can hope to employ with any degree of success. With Germany, Italy, and Japan no longer members the League has no opportunity for intervening with any real effect either Spain, Czechoslovakia or China. If, as it has been rightly contended, one of the principle reasons why action has not been taken in the Far East is because of European, preoccupations, the argument applies with, greater force at this present time, and any attempt to deal simultaneously with all the grievous problems existing at present in the world would result in a general dissipation f power and ultimate ineffectuality. This will be unpleasant reading to those who have supported the League in the past dnd still adhere strongly to the principles which inspired its foundation. But in such a world us this, where ideals so often have to wait upon reality it is as well that this Should be recognized.
1t is inconceivable íhat any resolutions which the Council may pass on any of the issues arising in connection with the three distressed countries already named will have any greater effect or importance than those which have already been passed. It was shown in connection with Abyssinia that a large number of nations were unprepared to go to the extreme of war to enforce League decisions. Indeed there was a marked tendency to leave it all to the great Powers, members of the League, and now that they are engaged on problems having a real immediate application to their own fortunes, it is not reasonable to suppose that they will subordinate their own needs to the dictates of the League Council. That reads un-j happily for those who firmly believe, that the League has a definite duty towards China in her present misfortunes. That such a duty exists cannot be denied, but it is unlikely that when China again presents her' vase at Geneva she will obtain anything more than the moral support which she has consistently received. With a dangerous bonfire raging in Spain, with the grave possibility of an enormous conflagration -breaking out around Czechoslovakia, it would be the height of imprudence to embark upon any commitments which would prevent the fullest,' swiftest action in Europe to avert the perils which threaten it. No one will refuse the greatest sympathy with China in the plight in which she finds herself. Many will agr&e that, if the League had taken that action in 1932, which it was hoped it would, much of what has happened since would never have joceurred, but the fact has now to be faced, that the sins of omission then ate now bearing íheir tragic fruit, and the forces of international disorder are more active today than they need ever have been. In Europe the firm attitude adopted by Great Britain, and France: has had a definite effect. There is always the possibility, so long as the present state of tension persists, that even more may have to be done, but it must be remembered that the commitments already entered into are not necessarily derived from any requirement of the League, but rather from the tragic realities of a very grave situation.
Consequently there is a likelihood that the League Council will find itself unable to arrive at any decisions calculated to have a modifying effect upon present disputes. There is, however, a danger that unwise resolutions may add to the fuel which is already smouldering dangerously, and statesmanlike efficiency at this time demands that every care shall be taken to make sure that there shall be nothing done likely to worsen and not better prevailing conditions. That is a danger which every endeavour should be made to avert, and it would appear that that best can be done by declining to make any commitments at all either one way or the other. If that course is followed—and after all it microly means that an ineffectual League shall for the time being rest on its oars umitil such time again comes when it can speak with authority—the Council will have made the only contribution towards the maintenance of the present very unstable peace which it has in its power to make. That will not please those who desire to see the League speaking, and acting with authority, but, dismembered as it is, at the very best its authority is greatly attenuated, especially when three great Powers are in the position, and have shown the disposition to ignore its rulings. Fortunately, for the League it is only in the matter of international politics that it has failed. In some of its other activities it has made a wonderful contribution to world progress, and while it has not achieved all it set out to perform, it has shown that given universal goodwill the time may come when, in some new form, it may prove of that value to mankind which its founders hoped for it. It may very well prove to be the case that it is being asked to keep out from where fools are at present rushing in, but it must be remembered that after all the children of this world are wiser only in their generation than the children of light. The principles of the League will one day prevail, but that day will be postponed, if the Council goes to the extreme of reaching for more ineffective decisions, Diplomatic Changes The diplomatic changes contemplated by Japan in Europe and the United States is obviously symptomatic of the desire of Gen, Ugaki, the Foreign Minister, to establish in these centres of greatest criticism the most able and influential representation possible at a time when the country's prestige abroad is ut its lowest ebb and its problems correspondingly more difficult. Mr. M. Shigemitsu, the present Ambassador to Moscow, is mentioned for the London post and as a choice it is impeccable for anybody who met him during his term in China, when he did more to narrow the, breach between his country and China than any of his predecessors, will agree that he has precisely the qualifications for the Court of St. James. Mr. S. Togo, Ambassador to Berlin, would go to Moscow with a detached view of Russian affairs gained during his German experience and. not. without some knowledge for he negotiated the sale of the Chinese Eastern Raikway. (Gen. Oshi tha becomes the contemplated appointee to Berlin where the suggestion of the change has been well received for he would be the first soldier appointed to the German capital and he is said to be one of the leading) spirits behind the Anti-Comintern Pact, Another change is the Washington post disting-wished by the occupancy of Mr. H. Saito, who has held it during a period when only the ex-excise of diplomatic qualities of the highest order and a calm, unruffled temperament. could weather the asperities of the office. Gen Ugaki's reported intention is to summon. him back to Tokyo to assist the Government and to replace him by Mr, K. Horinouchi, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affaixs. These are important changes for a country to make in face of such a grave national emergency arising out of the Sino-Japanese hostilities and the complexity of relations abroad, but they are dictated by circumstances. The withdrawal of Mr, Saito—he who subtly regaled his foreign visitors with "555" cigarettes when Japan, at Washington, was endeavouring to change the 5-5-3 naval ratio ito parity—is apparently part of Gen. Ugaki's scheme to have by his side veterans in foreign affairs to guide him in the future conduct of affairs.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.