The sudden resignation of M. Litvinov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, at such a juncture as this must create the greatest perplexity in the European chan-colleries busily engaged in seeking to induce Russia to join in the anti-aggression pact. It has been apparent during these last few days that the conversations between Whitehall and the Kremlin have not been progressing towards a successful conclusion quite so rapidly as it was first hoped, and to whatever progress was being made a check has been administered by the removal of M. Litvinov, even though it be true that this has been on his own request. Speaking before the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party, M. Josef Stalin showed that there was a distinct cleavage between his policy, and that which M. Litvinov was seeking to follow. The former accused the west ern democracies of seeking to provoke a war between the Reich and the Soviet in order that thereby their own difficulties might be solved. There is, of course, no foundation in truth for such a statement, and at the most appears to be only a very twisted reading of the international situation wholly con-contradictory of the real facts. With the offer of guarantees to Poland and Rumania against German aggression, Great Britain was in fact giving Russia a certain degree of protection against whatever designs Herr Hitler may ultimately have against the Ukraine, and expansion in that direction has always been one of Der Fuehrer's schemes. For to reach the Ukraine now would only be possible either with the consent of Poland, and Rumania or by that direct military aggression against which both France and Great Britain have resolutely set their faces. The suggestion has been made that by giving these guarantees to Poland, and Rumania before consulting Moscow Mr. Chamberlain was putting the cart before the horse, but when the tense situation which prevailed after the grabbing of Albania is remembered, and the grave necessity for speedy action, it is quite clear that the method which was adopted was the only possible one likely to be productive of immediate results.
The situation became complicated directly Russia was approached, for Poland in particular was averse to any arrangement predicated upon the possibility of Soviet armies gaining entrance into its territory, and even though it was suggested that Russian assistance to Poland could be restricted to the Russian air force, there was always the possibility that, with Russia fighting to aid Poland, Germany might seek to pass through Poland to strike at the powerful ally to the east. There was, consequently, always the possibility that in the long run Poland would become just as much of a Germano-Russian cockpit as it was during the Great War. From this it may be seen that, while Poland would like to avail itself of all the assistance available against possible German aggression, it is reluctant' to embark upon such a policy as might bring about disastrous results, especially if one of those results was the ultimate bolshevization of the country. M. Litvinov saw in the inclusion of Russia in a mutual anti-aggression pact a restoration to some degree of that policy of collective security of which he has always been an ardent supporter. It is clear, despite the statements which have been made in the House of Commons, that he has failed in carrying through his scheme, and that because the latest proposals of Moscow have been rejected by both Great Britain and France. It is stated that these, if acceptable, would have amounted to a tri-partite alliance beween, Britain, France and Russia and the conclusion of military accords; in fact the creation of a situation very similar to that which existed on the outbreak of the Great War. Anglo-French rejection of such a scheme seems to require more than a little clarification. If it is sought to secure the completest front against whatever aggression may be contemplated in the future, surely, the conclusion of so definite an agreement would be the best means of doing so. That such a scheme would be hotly resented by the dictator countries would be inevitable. It might also be that this would have led to the formation of an anti-Comintern military alliance such that which at present Japan is reluctant to join, but as the step from a Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis to a military understanding is but a short one that should not have too much weight in leading Britain and France to reject the Russian proposals.
The exclusion of the Far East from the purview of any arrangement which might have been reached between Britain, France and Russia may have induced Japan to retrain from throwing in her lot with the other parties to-the Axis, but, as has already been pointed out, Russia would be reluctant to enter into any arrangement from which she would not receive as much benefit A the other two nations. Obviously the chief item for speculation at the moment must be as to what trend Russian foreign policy will now follow. It is hardly to be believed that it will amount to a complete throwing over of M. Litvinov's policy, though it must be admitted that this is a possibility which cannot lightly be disregarded. Much will depend upon the counter-proposals which Great Britain and France are preparing. If they indicate any desire to bestow upon Russia an inferior status in any tripartite arrangement which may be proposed, it may be taken for granted that they will be rejected. The exclusion of Moscow from European affairs at Munich, and subsequently, was resented at the time, and M. Stalin may be expected to reject any proposals which do not permit him to rank with those other European nations which are now inviting his collaboration in the maintenance of peace. It is a matter for which at some date or other in the future there may be considerable regret, that there still exists in the governments of the democracy ies a reluctance to face all the realities of the present situation. If the assistance of Russia is necessary for the purpose of securing European peace every inducement should be offered to obtain it. This is no time for equivocations or arriere-penses, and if it is found that M. Stalin's terms will be stiffer than were those of M. Litvinov the hesitant cies of the immediate past will have been the cause. If the British doctrine, that the government of a nation is that nation's sole concern, is to be adhered to, then there is no reason why the agreement between the two nations should be with any reservations whatever. That and that alone is the realise tic way of looking at the matter. If Russian assistance is worth having it is worth paying for properly, but if it can be dispensed with, that is a bird of an entirely different feather.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.