The Archive · 1937

The Plenary Session

Feb, 18. phere Is no reason to believe that the Third Plenary Session of the Fifth Koumintang will emerge from Important discussions now about to engage its attention with any, Aecisive assertions of policy indeed, spectacular changes in method or personnel of the Govern~ ment. The issues arising from the upheaval' in Shensi with its dramatic detention of the person of the Generalissimo and his no less] dramatic release after a fortnight's captivity have been so far solved that the Central Government again In control of the Province where General Ku Chu-tung, as} Nanking's representative, has' declared his conviction that' normality] is being restored, the Communists! effectively bottled and the relations with Kansu satisfactory. Tt is not surprfiing therefore "that the! political atmosphere in Nanking! should be charged less with concern to examine the Government's policy than with eagerness to ascertain the possibility of changes in high office. In other words the permutations and combinations of personal polities hold the stage, as invariably) happens when the machinery of a party organization is being subject its periodical overhaul by conference and pronouncements. Tt may be that the chief figures in the Government—following respectable precedent elsewhero—incline to the! view that the public forum of the Plenary Session is best confined to endorsement of general principles} and that private negotiations advance will determine more vital questions of policy. How far that effort to Keep controversial issues:

the background will be success~ Tui must depend a good deal on the altitude which General Chiang, Kal-shek will adopt on resuming'

tive work a President of the Executive Yuan. Mr. Wang Ching-wel's return settles the procedure!

the actual opening of the ossian' for, as Chairman of the Political Council, the former President of the Executive Yuan wilt automatically perform that task.

Mr, Wang Ching-wel has published one or two statements current affairs, but they have not seemed {o touch the basic problems of the situation. He is always thoughtful and his emphasis on the need for internal unity Is not less imitable because it lacks originity or novelty. Neither he nor General Chiang' Kaleshek ts disposed to ignore the seriousness of the Communist challenge, but hats not shown that the economic significance of the support given the Reds is as important as the un= doubted military danger which their control of certain tracts in' Chinese territory connotes. General Chiang Kai-shek has not departed. from his People's Reconstruction Programme in clear recognition of the need for setting up a real national effort to solve national problems in terms understood by. the—predominantly agricultural population. The Government requires encouragement to translate! those words into action, Will that encouragement be forthcoming in the contribution which General Chiang Kai-shek has to make to the! Session's labours? His experiences during. the last two months have had their value. They have not merely_ reaffirmed the eminence of his posi~ tion inthe Government or his personal prestige. They have brought him in close stark contact with realities which are not so} readily discerned in Nanking, They have also Tevealed in the political machine at headquarters certain hesitations which may point to a need for reassessing personal values. Adversity tests sincerity and fidelity. Profit accrues from acceptance of the lessons thus offered. It will not be the first time that a' Government discovers the difference between the promulgation of an order and the execution of that order by agents remote from the seat of authority. The achlevements credited to the Central Government are solid enough; it would Be tragic if they failed to develop the popular support they deserve merely because weak flesh in the provinces was not equal to the task Of performing the behests of the] willing spirit at Nanking.

'Turning from internal to external affairs, the delegates may feel] Bound' to consider the progress made by the Government in com~ Ing understanding with' Japan, The recent provincial dis~ turbances—frst in Kwangtung and Kwangsi and then in Shensi and. Kansu—were marked by efforts to call in question the policy of the; Government in handling Sino-'Japanese relationships. The threats of civil war seemed to be based on, fa desire to force the Government Into an aggressive attitude against Japan. How far those protestations wore merely pretexts for hostility, to Nanking or were genuine expres~ sions of resentment at what was considered to be an ineffective treatment of Japanese eneroachment it may be discreet to refrain from gauging. Thanks to Mr. Shigeru Kawagoc's sympathetic and reasonable appreciation of the problems confronting the Chinese! Government, there seems to be in Tokyo a less rigid mistrust of Nan~ King's bona fides. The Sian episode was marked by Japanese solicitude. For the welfare of General: Chiang Kal-shek and, at no time, did it appear that Tokyo was inclined to) take advantage of China's temporary. embarrassment, Inthe North the-smuggling difficulty can~ not be ignored, but even there it would be wise to assume that Japanese policy is more concerned with what Tokyo regards is the danger to Japan from the other side of the Manchurian border than with deliberate plan for further at-{ritlon of Chinese soil. Economic ce-operation between the two eountries on the basis of equality and common interests need not neces~ sarily imply economic penetration in, dominance of China's internal affalls. Danger signals are flown in Japan's too evident obsession by an exaggerated notion of Communist} activities and in the recent proof the power still widded by the] Kwantung Army. Nevertheless the Government is in a. strong position to vindicate Its conciliatory attitude toward Japan since Mr. Kawagoe has so admirably defined the possibility of an honourable approach to an accord based on true prin~ ciples of neighbourliness, bringing] firmly Into view the point on which Japanese diplomats and soldiers are agreed: that China cannot do without Japan, any more than Japan can do without China. Moreover, strengthening its national defences, the Government at Nanking] can steer sagely the middle course in avoidance of stupid provocation on the one hand and spineless surrender on the other. Such a policy: of moderation is compatible with. the financial, political and economic problems which the Government finds it imperative to tackle for the sake of fostering its proper influence and affirming the derivation. of its authority from the support fand confidence of the people.

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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