Feb, 17.
The entry of the Government's troops into Sian has in one respect solved the military problem created by the recent revolt, The authori ties at Nanking are not likely to delude themselves that the whole of the situation to which the activities of the Red Armies in Kansu and North Shens! have so potently eon~ tributed has been liquidated. To begin with, the numerical strength of the Communist forces is estimated to be not less than 60,000, Although that figure—includes seallyway bands which vary from the very irregular to the highly irregular in quality, there is a sui dent stiffening of hardbitten campaigners well versed in all the ricks of guerrilla warfare, held together by a real sense of dis~ cipline, many 6f them fired by a genuine spirit of crusading fervour, directed by leaders whose strategic ability is by no means negligible, tas the record of their Odyssey from Kinngsi proves. In Shensi the focal point of this Communist organiza~ Vion scorns to be at Fushih, midway between the Kansu and Shans borders and on the left bank of the!
Yen Shui tributary of the Yellow River, From Fushih the Communists control some 40,000 troops who dominate the North of Shensi, Another Red concentration—estimated at 3,000—is in the extreme north-east of Shensi on the Shansi border near the point where the Ulan Muren River runs: into the Yellow River. To the west, on the! other side of the Province and north-west of the Paiyu Shan Mis., the tongue of Shensi which thrusts itself out into Suiyuan, Ningsia and Kans Is almost entirely" under communist control with Red troops, about 0,000 strong, in support al Tingpien and Anpienpu. In Kans the Communists are. reported to be dominant in the districts around Changyeh on the edge of the Gobi Desert, the troops under them bein put at'4,000. The remainder of the Red units are believed to be seat along the Shensi-Kansu. border the neighbourhood of Pinhsien. n of the Central led apparently to a withdrawal of the Red forees from the vicinity of that City, but it may be doubted whether signs of Communist pro-Dogands wht aizappear with equal criss hea been solved. 'The political problem remains. 'The hullo of the people, desirous of relief from the ferment of banditry and military' alarums, are believed to be content to leave their welfare in the hands General Chiang Kai-shek in whose solicitude they can trust. The radical elements, who made themselves conspicuous a few weeks ago in Sian and the countryside of Shensi, have not given up the ghost. They would like to claim that they ave heading a mass movement; in reality they are merely engineering station which does not appear to the commonsense of the Shensi peasants so long as the Government is prepared to show firmness and sympathy with local problems. The contacts established by the Red lers in Sian and other Shensi cities were used to spread the im= pression that looting and destruction no longer figured in their chnique. Even foreign mise jon aries were assured of con side rate treatment in pursuance of the policy of uniting China against external aggression. Reports of the burning of mission buildings at Fushth have discounted the value of such promises. Some of the Communists may be sincerely anxious to incorporate their political aspirations in resumption of allegiance to} the Kuomintang and to rehabilitate their respectability. Whether they can induce the: majority of their associates and colleagues to see eye! to eye with them there is open to doubt, The Central Government) may have means to test the good faith of some on whose behalf this theory has been advanced. It is well-advised to' relax none of its vigilance in dealing with the Communists as a whole until more solid evidence of the fading of red thoughts is available. Indeed the presence of some 60,000 Red troops in various districts of Kansu and 'Shensi presents the Government with a diMeult problem which cannot be regarded as settled merely' by the occupation of Sian and the creation of a barrier to prevent the further southward movement of Red forees.
The country now infested by the Reds is anything but luxuriant, Their acquisition of the habits of guerrilla warfare, implying as they, do sustenance from the territory] under their occupation is not likely] to endear them to the peasantry who have, however, little choice between acceptance of Communist] dominance and the loss of what poor livelihood the country affords. Communism, in fact, counts for nothing, since soldier' and peasant! alike are reduced to the fundamental issue of keeping body and soul together—the fraternization of a common despair, There is really spiritual link between Soademic: fantasies, of, toe riber propagandists and the grim asperites of the life which the Reds in the field and their unwilling coad-jurors are sharing, The formation. of local Soviets may owe its official Jargon and its pretentious literature to inspiration from Communist theorists. In actual working it is nothing more than a rough-and~ ready effort by outlawed adventurers to create for themselves and their comrades that way of living] which General Chiang Kai-shel People's Economic Reconstruction. Programme should eventually determine on scientife lines. The, peculiar diMeulty of the terrain—apart from other considerations—makes the {dea of launching an elaborate military campaign to sweep up and exterminate the Red Armies a task of such colossal @imensions that prudent finance alone would demur to it except as: a last desperate resort. Yet the Government can hardly accept the: Communist regime as compatible with its own policy and integrity of administration without running the grave risk of finding itself inextricably embarrassed. More years ago General raised the cry of Three Principles" thus initiating] the purge of the Communist elements then dominating China His policy has consistently* con-_ formed to that attitude. Events: have proved its wisdom.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.