Whether Signor Mussolini's speech in Rome on the capture of Barcelona by the Spanish insurgents was intended as an answer to M. Bonnet's address before the French Chamber of Deputies or not, matters very little, in view of the fact that that is what it actually amounts to. It is suggested that Il Duce could not possibly have had the full text of the French statesman's address, though there is the possibility that he had received certain excerpts. Signor Mussolini's reference to the slogan of the Spanish Government "No pasaran!" brought from him the added, significant remark "But we have passed and I say now that we shall pass." That remark, reinforced with placards bearing the legend "If France should utter her Never again, we shall not care a damn," seems to have been clearly directed against France, and, in the circumstances, suggests the threat that unless Italy gets what she wants from France peace fully, she will seek to obtain it by force. Nevertheless, when all the circumstances in which that phraseywas used are taken into sideration, there is still the probability mat Il Duce was speaking for home consumption. But whether that is so or not, his remarks cannot be conceived to have been designed for the purpose of bettering a rapidly deteriorating condition, and may indeed be taken as something of a portent as to what may be expected, if not next week at least in the comparatively near future. Even more interesting is his reference to the freeing of Spain "from the infamy of the Re That has not yet been completely achieved, and may not for some time to come, though there are suggestions that the general morale amongst the Republican troops has suffered somewhat as a result of the blow at Barcelona. When it is remembered that there are indications that Germany may desire better relations even if only commercially with Soviet Ru: sia, it is clear that the two Dictators in following their common policies are indulge ing in the delightful game of "pull devil, pull baker," with either the democracies, or Soviet Russia as the object of their attention M. Bonnet's speech was a masterly e pose of French foreign policy. France will continue her policy of non-intervention in Spain, and will not tolerate foreign interference with French interests in that country, nor with the French communications with North Africa by foreign troops in Spain or on the Spanish islands. In this respect he emphasized the community of interest between Great Britain and France in this matter, and a re-enunciation of general policy at such a juncture is probably the best thing which could have happened. He is most likely on less secure grounds when he expressed the hope that trusting collaboration might be estab between France and Germany. There is no real reason to suppose that the better relations which exist between those two cour tries, as compared with French relation with Italy are any more substantial than Anglo-Italian relationships in view of the present Anglo-German tension. The general position seems to be that Germany@is content to play the role of Codlin towards France, leaving the less congenial role of Short to Italy, while with regard to Great Britain the parts are reversed, the result being that up to the present no progress has been made towards the establishment of better relations between the two groups of Powers. M. Bonnet's speech is a clear warning that if by such tactics it is sought to diminish the importance of the Anglo-French undertaking they are doomed to failure, and his emphasis upon the bonds binding the two countries makes it quite clear that attempts to break down the entente cordiale are as unlikely to succeed in the future as they have been in the past. The menace of the Rome-Berlin axis is in itself sufficient to assure that the nations on either side of the Channel will continue to maintain a united front. Were Europe passing through a lengthy period of peace, it might be possible to make scme progress towards breaking down such a combination, but in these days of power politics, with the continual threat of war, self-interest, if nothing more noble, dictates that an understanding tested as it has been in strife and concentrated as it has been by the blood of both nations should continue to be effectly It is more than likely that Mr. Chamberlain when he addresses the House of Commons next week will take occasion to make a similar pronouncement. If he does he will do so after Herr Hitler has made his anxiously awaited speech. It is not necessary that the British Prime Minister should do so before, as British feeling in the matter has already been amply manifested. It is in reality a subject upon which there is nothing new to say. Indeed the only novelty in this week's speeches has been the iterated belligerency of Signor Mussoli utterances. They need not at the moment provide any cause for undue anxiety, for they not to be taken as indicative of immediate action, but rather in the nature of (preparing the atmosphere for what Herr Hitler may have to say on Monday next, a setting of the stage rather than the prologue to the actual performance. It is not yet believed that the Italian public is desirous for war. The welcome given to Mr. Chamberlain while in Rome was indeed a recognition of the man who at any rate for a time has secured peace in Europe, permitting of the inference that the great mass of the Italians are as little desirous of war, as similar demonstrations in Germany when Mr. Chamberlain went there last year were proof of the existence of the same feeling. It cannot. however, be ignored that the leaders of the totalitarian states can plunge their countries in war willy-nilly. They may even now believe that in such a gamble they stand a very good chance of emerging victors, but it may be safely said that there is no country in Europe at the present moment which would view an outbreak of armed hostilities with anything but the gravest dismay. In all probability during the next few weeks both Herr Hitler and Il Duce will seek to discover just how far they can go in furthering the demands which they are expected to put forward. If in the quiet terms used by the leaders of the democratic states they are told with a firmness which cannot be mistaken, if it is borne in upon them that bluffs can no longer succeed, they may indeed hesitate for a very long while before embarking on a course of action which may not only prove unprofitable, but actually catastrophic to them.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.