"That is an entirely una conclusion. I went there, fir foremost, because, in what appeared io be almost a desperate situation, that seemed to offer the only chance of averting a European war.
"The frst and most immediate object of my visit was achieved. Peace in Europe was saved. If it had not been for these visits, hundreds of thousands of families would today be mourning for the flower of European manhood.
Really, I have no need to defend my visits to Germany, for what was the alternative? Nothing that we, France or Russia could have done could possibly have saved Czechoslovakia from invasion and destruction. Even if we had subsequently gone to war to punish Germany and, after frightful losses inflicted on all partakers, we had been victorious, we could never have reconstructed Czechoslovakia as it was framed by the Versailles Treaty.
"L went to Munich to further the policy sometimes called "European appeasement,' If that policy were to succeed, it was essential that no Power should seek {o obtain a general domination of Europe, but that each should be content to obtain reasonable facilities for developing its own resources, securing its own international trade and improving the conditions of its own people."
Herr Hitler's Assurances comment on the speed of Commons yesterday Chamberlain, the and in recommend-for adjusting Great reign policy to meet the tion. jonid now resign, feature dhues as "Broken Pledge: report of Mr. Chamberlain's speech.
mes" comments that Mr.
showed how fully he indignation, as well as the ment, of his countrymen at tering of international conce caused PY the wanton German invasion of Czechoslovakia."
His on the wireless both me Britain and overseas, the jou must feel the force of his denunciation of breach of faith that fol-the Munich pledges. As it is, journal goes on to declare, the changes that have occurred the past week are a "dete and unilateral violation of agreement," he Times" states that Sir Nevile sid arson, the British Ambassador eT will no doubt help to "question Mr. Chamberlain ed, but did not himself attempt whether the rethe end of a series, first of a new series.
Caution and Preparedness Mr. Chamberlain then lengthily referred to Herr Hitler's assurances in Munich, that the Sudetenlands were his last territorial ambitions in Europe, which he had confirmed in a speech in Berlin.
"In view of these repeated assurances," he went on, "I considered myself justified in founding the hope that once the Czechoslovak question was settled, as it seemed to be at Munich, it would be possible to carry further the policy of appeasement, "Nevertheless, I was not prepared to relax precautions until that policy had been established and accepted by others.- Therefore, after the Munich conference, our defence programme was actually accelerated and expanded in order to remedy certain weak-hich became apparent during "1 am convinced that after Munich great majority of the British people shared my hope and ardently desired that the policy should be carried further. But today I share their disappointment and indignation that those hopes have been so wan-tenty shattered.
"How can these events be recon-oiled with the assurances I have read to you? Surely, as a joint signatory to the Munich Agreement, I was entitled, if Herr Hitler thought that ought to be undone, to the consultation which is provided for in the Munich declaration?
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.