The Archive · 1939

Essay in Sarcasm

IMPARTIAL OF NEUTRAL

If indeed Herr Hitler did rewrite the speech he was to make at Wilhelmshaven on Saturday, after learning of Mr.

Chamberlain's declaration with regard to the guaranteeing of Poland's integrity, intention of making a fiery reply to British Prime Minister, the original must have been about Der Fuehrer has ey amended version is not particularly imposing, for while in the main it contains considerable sarcasm, the only real retort to latest decision of the Briti ment was a veiled threat cumstances Herr Hitl denunciation of the Anglo-Treaty. Itis to be believed that that wa contingency which Mr. Chamberlain advisers alwa, minds, f. must have realized th bound to call forth a ce German leader. In the reply is one of moderation, ud vastly different from some of the other of his speeches which have been awaited with an anxiety as a rule quite out of proportion to the actual event. Any student of what has been happening in recent years must have realized that, unless the democracies were to become increasingly supine until actual weakness se! lin, there would have to be a limit to the complacency with which German expansion by power diplomacy could be viewed. The Austrian anschluss was in itself bad enough The crisis of September last was but other example of the danger arising from the manner in which Herr Hitler sought to carry out his expansionist policies, while the final grabbing of Czechoslovakia could not fail, in the light of all that had happened, to be just that further straining of the limits which finally called forth more posi tive action on the part of Great Br than had hitherto been witnessed.

If Herr Hitler's audience at Wilhelmshaven convinced by the Leader's rhetor Germany is indeed being surrounded by hostile ud aggressive forces, those more fortunatel} placed with completer access to the w news will not be. The fore: aggrandisement which has be n effec ted "by Herr Hitler is the only form of a sion which has been noticed of recent years in Europe. There has been nothing of th same sort on the port of the European democracies. They have for all too acquiesced, willingly, or unwillingly, in what ne Dictator states have been doing, until t fear has arisen as to her they have not allowed them to go too far. It is idle now to endeavour to fix blame for the failure of Mr. Chamberlain's policy of appeasement. It is, however, only fair to point out that so long as he believed there was any chance of its ssu ceding he was bound to continue with it. Through no fault of his own it failed, and the British Prime Minister stands a bitterly disillusioned man, amidst the ruins of his attempted reconstruction of peace, endeavouring now to build up a security which he has been now forced to realize was at all times threatened. The fact that he has turned from his policy of appeasement to one preparing for the possibilities of war, does not that he has committed Great Britain to an se] ug aggressive policy, or that those whom Herr Hitler has bitterly dubbed the war-mongo: have secured any greater influence in the British Cabinet than they have had in the past. All that it is now being sought to do is to create a modified form of collective security. based upon nothing more than the mutual agreement amongst certain nations to go to each other's help in the event of aggres sion. The responsibility for a European war, if unfortunately one does come, has been quite definitely placed upon Herr Hitler's shoulders, unless there should take place some far-reaching change in the common policies of Great Britain and France. Herr Hitler has only to embark upon another attempt to expand Germany in Europe by force to bring about a war which would be catastrophic.

The studied moderation of his speech, and his declaration that the next party congress would be called the "Party Congress of Peace," may be attributed to the present situation, and his hope that the holding out of this particular olive branch may have the effect of deluding Great Britain, France, Poland and Russia into the belief that after all there is no real hurry for the defensive arrangements which are being contemplated. 1f that is indeed his idea, the events of the last week or so should have warned them that in the light of his actions Herr. Hitler's words now carry very little conviction. The manner in which his statement after that he had no further territorial ambitions in Europe, was subsequently belied by all that has happened since permits of no favourable deduction to be made from the name which he intends to give the next Party Congress. The proof of any pudding of his confection can now only be in the eating; so many of the others have proved so unpalatable. Denunciation of the Anglo-German Naval Treaty would come as no surprise after all that has already transpired. If it did, it would be only just one more piece of evidence to show that the British and French statesmen had been lulled into a state of false security, from which, fortunately, they have now emerged. Far from it being possi ble to criticize the incongruity of the acceptance of Munich, and Britain's hurried acceleration of rearmament, it is now only possible to believe that even Mr. Chamberlain had early cause to believe that Munich was not the end but the commencement of German aggression. The only real question which now worries Europe is whether the belated offer of support to Poland made last week will have all the effect hoped for it. That on]y Herr Hitler knows. He may yet proceed with his contemplated demands upon Poland with the idea that he may again be able to bluff his way through by a demonstra tion of might.

If he does, and Poland deter mines to resist there may be no "Party Congress of Peace." The delegates to it will, in all probability, be urgently engaged elsewhere.

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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