The Archive · 1938

The Seven Devils

Mr. Herbert Hoover, former president of the United States, has detailed his impressions formed during his recent tour of Europe in an address before the U.S. Council of Foreign Relations, which was broadcast throughout America. From the summary received in Shanghai by cable, it is clear that Mr. Hoover has made one of the most important unofficial pronouncements which has been uttered for a very long time, and its significance is such that it deserves the widest possible publicity. There are seven devils afflicting the peace of Europe. They are:—(1) the rise of dictatorships, "all with planned economies": (2) the international arms race: (3) increased government debts and deficits: (4) increased efforts by individual European Powers to secure self-sufficiency in industry and agriculture: (5) failure of the League of Nations: (6) fear—nations of each other, governments of their people, people of their governments and everywhere a vague fear of war and (7) a steady increase of brutality and terrorism in some nations. Of those seven devils the most potent is the sixth: it is chiefly fear, with all the sub-divisions into which Mr. Hoover splits it, which is the root of much of the world's present malaise. Economic fears have resulted in the raising of trade barriers and the struggle of some countries for self-sufficiency within their own borders. Similar emotion has led to the development of a selfish nationalism, in place of the internationalism which was growing so flourishingly up to the time of the Great War. In some countries it is plain that the governments fear their people. It is not true of all dictatorships at the moment, but in the case of Russia it is apparent that all these state trials and purges have arisen out of M. Stalin's apprehension lest he might be evicted from the seat of government by a growing opposition which for the time being, at least, has had its head mercilessly crushed beneath the stern heel of the presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court.

There is, however, a greater fear in all dictatorships, ana that arises out of the realization that only by a consistent achievement of success can they hope to continue. Napoleon was a dictator: he remained in power just so long as he was able to present the French people with success, and when he failed his system of government was destroyed. It can safely be said of the existing dictatorships that they have to maintain an unchanging string of successes if they are to keep their hold upon the people under them, and it is the fear that they may not be able to do that which may eventually lead them to desperate courses. History is replete with such cases, and it is the increase of internal fear which is likely to contribute most towards the growing anxieties of the nations regarding international developments.

The steady increase of brutality and terrorism are directly attributable to the domestic uncertainty, externally it is reflected by the huge arms race in which all the nations of the world are indulging. Self-sufficiency rises from the same emotion, it is an indication of the desire to secure ample protection from whatever threats which may at some time or other be made against the nation devoted to such a policy. Mr. Hoover has painted a hideous picture. It is the picture of a civilization frightening itself into immorality, into its own destruction, into the reduction of all that mankind has laboriously built up through the centuries to a state of chaos. In this study of unadulterated gloom two bright tints are introduced. Europe's economic recovery, according io ihe ex-president, is more advanced than that of the United States. That should tend towards a greater contentment, though some will find it difficult to see where it can be found. The other lies in the fact that Europe is not yet prepared for war. It is true that some nations are more advanced than others, but the difference between the various Powers or combinations of Powers is not so great as to permit any of them putting their fortunes to the arbitrament of war.

From this it is to be supposed that there is still some time available in which to negotiate a general appeasement. So far as Europe is concerned that is the end towards which Mr. Neville Chamberlain is directing his energies and policies. That is the reason for his opening of negotiations with Italy. Upon them depends much of the future of Europe. It is clear that even when the obstacles to Anglo-

Italian understanding have been removed, there will still be much to do to bring about that state of contentment without which there can be no real peace in Europe. That Mr. Hoover emphasizes in his reference to the "injustices and unrealities" in the post-war treaties: There is a great deal to be said for the contention that documents were obtained under duress, Of course they were. The defeated nations had no other alternative than to accept them or go to war again, and that latter, of course, they were in no position to do. It may be a paradox, but it seems from past history to be true that the worst possible time at which to negotiate a peace treaty is at the end of a war. It could not, of course, be negotiated at any other time, but if mankind could find some way of bringing about a truce during which the status quo was maintained until the heat of warfare among the nations had cooled down, it might be possible to effect more equitable arrangements than have been secured in the past.

Peace treaties in the past have been negotiated in an atmosphere almost amounting to hatred, a most fruitful source of fear. And so the vicious circle is followed until the world is brought back to the worst of the seven devils. Collective security might have got rid of them. That method has been rejected by some of the dictatorships, and now the world must resort, unless it regains a degree of sanity very shortly, to the old practice of seeking to cast them out by Beelzebub.

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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