The success of the Anglo-Italian negotiations and the arrival at an accord between the two nations is already bearing fruit, for it is reported that the French Charge d'Affaires in Rome has delivered an invitation to the Italian Government from M. Edouard Daladier for the commencement of conversations aiming at a Franco-Italian pact of friendship. It is being rapidly shown that Mr. Chamberlain's policy has blazed a new trail and that France with typical realism has fully recognized the benefits to be derived from the effecting of a better understanding with Italy. The latter has an opportunity of showing, by the quickness with which she accepts the invitation, what degree of cordiality she can import into her negotiations with France. It is clear that the negotiations can proceed to a satisfactory. conclusion much swifter than in the case of the Anglo-Italian rapprochement, for it is pointed out thať many of the questions in which France is interested have already been settled along lines acceptable to France in the agreement which has been signed by Great Britain and Italy. Thus Italian adherence to the London Naval Treaty of 1936 is as acceptable to France as it is to Great Britain. The same may be said of the Italian acceptance of the Montreaux Treaty permitting Turkey to re-fortify the Dardanelles, while the Italian acceptance of a compromise withdrawal from Spain and the pledge that Rome seeks no territorial, military, political or colonial advantages in that country should set French uneasiness on that score at rest. With those items already satisfactorily disposed of, the number of outstanding problems is greatly reduced, and of them all, the chief concern the questions of Syria, Tunisia and the question of hostile propaganda, There is nothing prima facie, to suggest that these problems are incapable of solution in a manner agreeable to both countries, and should M. Daladier and Signor Mussolini succeed in adjusting their differences the complete appeasement of the Mediterranean would be an accomplished fact, with all the benefits which would naturally accrue from so complete and effective an adjustment.
It is doubtful whether those political commentators who see in these developments an attempt to break down the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo entente have much upon which to base their conclusion. From the statements of the British Prime Minister it is clear that his chief objective was the appeasement of Europe and the production of a degree of political stability in that portion of the world which would restore a rapidly diminishing sense of security. It is quite plain that the end most desired would be the arrangement of a pact between the four western European Powers. The refusal of those countries to set up hostile camps and perpetuate divisions between themselves would be the best foundation for the peace of the world, and a definite counter to the policy of the Soviet Government which sees in the chaos, which another war would undoubtedly create, the best opportunity for the advancement of that world revolution to which the Communists are irrevocably pledged.' The Japanese "Nichi Nichi" doubts whether France would obey the logic of such a development and liquidate the alliance between herself and Russia, but it is believed that if France could find that degree of security in western Europe, which a Four Power Pact would inevitably entail, her enthusiasm for the understanding with Russia might very well undergo a very profound modification, Nothing would suit Soviet Russia better than a worldwide war, especially if she did not have to fight in it herself, and it has always to be remembered. that despite the existence of alliance with the Soviet Union, there is no real guarantee that Moscow would display any great enthusiasm over adhering to its provisions. That is not so much due to any question of Russia's outlook upon the subject of international morality, as to the internal conditions prevailing in the land, The events of the past two years have conclusively proved the uncertainty with which the civil side of the Soviet Government regards the loyalty of the military. Entrance of the Soviet into the war would entail the subordination of civilian interests to military necessities, and consequently the accession to greater power of the high command, the purging of which so comparatively short a time ago clearly shows it not then to have seen eye to eye with Mr. Stalin.
There is nothing to prove at the moment that there is any greater degree of loyalty amongst the Russian troops to the Kremlin now than there was when the purge was embarked upon, and for that reason Russia must be regarded as a very uncertain and undependable factor in endeavouring te assess future trends. Thus a settlement of British, French and Italian differences, may very well lead to an adjustment of outstanding questions between Britain, France and Germany. That undoubtedly is the end which Mr. Chamberlain has in mind. He is not concerned so much with endeavouring to weaken the understanding between Rome, Berlin and Tokyo as with the achievement of a better European situation by the settlement of those outstanding questions which ne day or another will have to be adjusted if war is to be avoided. The wisdom of a policy which leads to a better understanding between Britain, France and Italy is unquestionable, even if only because it paves the way for an ultimate settlement with Berlin. It is but natural that in the circumstances the Russian official organ "Pravda" should comment adversely upon the result of the Anglo-Italian negotiations. A general understanding amongst the western European Powers is inimical to Soviet Russian interests, as presenting a complete barrier to the spread of Communism, and in this connection it has to be admitted that if it comes to a question of whether a Communist or a Fascist Spain is preferable in the interests of either Great Britain or France, it should be plainly stated that the existence of a communist state so close to the African continent would be far more disquietening than the presence of a Fascist nation. That in no way conflicts with the British doctrine that each and every country hás the right to decide what form its government should take, and in that light the limited intervention in Spain is still to be deplored. A friendly Fascist state would be infinitely preferable to a communistic with all its manifest desire for the extension of its political beliefs, and if the only means to prevent that is the following of such a policy as that of Mr.. Chamberlain, then, reality demands that the fact should be accepted.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.