The Archive · 1938

JAPAN'S RESPONSIBILITY

2 Feb. 7; The addressing of similar Notes by Great! Britain, France and the United States to Japan on the subject of her naval intentions should serve to clarify the alr, no matter what attitude Tokyo adopts in the matter. She may refuse to give the information desired of her, and in all probability that will mean that the Powers concerned will accept as correct the information upon which they. based their communications, That has not been made public, but it is apparent that Japan has already commenced, or contemplates the commencement of, the construc tion of war vessels outside the limits prescribed by the London Naval Treaty, and that the signatories to that document feel that advantage should be taken of those safeguards. which were inserted in the Treaty as precautions against the very situation that has now, apparently, arisen. Japan is party to no treaty limiting the numbers or sizes of her war vessels, and shortly after she left the London Naval Conference in 1936, when her proposal for a "common upper limit" was rejected, the Naval Minister boasted that Japan had now been "released from the naval ratio bondage." There is, therefore, no reason why she should not proceed to increase her Navy to any extent she considers desirable, and in any consideration wf the subject] that fact should always be borng in mind. It] does not matter how wise or unwise her naval policy may be considered, it is perfectly plain that Japan is well within her rights to do what it is believed she is either, actually doing or about to do. Tt must be apparent that the three Governments acted upon information which they have every reason to believe, for no responsible Government would take such action upon mere guesswork ar ill-founded belief, 'The United States' Note is quite explicit. It says:—

"There for some time have been persistent and cumulative reports, which, in the absence of explicit assurances from the Japanese Government that they are unfounded, must be deemed authentic that Japan has undertaken or intends to undertake the construction of capital ships and cruisers not. in. conformity with the above limits. (Those to which Great Britain, France and the United States are fammitted "by the London Naval Treaty Governments do not address Notes in terms {such as those unless they are quite sure of their ground, and it would seem that there is very little room for Japan to reply with 9 denial, Refusal to give the assurances required will immediately bring the "escalator" clause of the London Naval Treaty into operation. Article 25 provides:—

In the event of any vessel not in conformity with the Limitations and restrictions as. to standard displacement and armament pres cribed by -Afticles 4, 5 and 7 of the present Treaty being authorized constructed, acquired by a Power not a pany to. the present Treaty, each High Contracting Party] Feserves the Tight to depart if, and to the extent which, He considers such departures necessary in order to meet the requirements of His national safety.......-

It will be seen that what appears to be the present naval policy of Japan does not bring about any breach of the provisions of the Treaty to which the-three countries are party, but provides for their taking common action within, ils framework calculated to offset whatever may turn out to be Japan's ultimate intentions.. Failing a! satisfactory reply from Japan, these three Powers will take steps permuted by: the above clause and proceed with any construction they may deem neces: sary always notifying each other of their intentions."°'Thus, should they find that Japan is indeed proceeding with the construction of 'a 45,000 ton capital ship armed with 18 in. guns, they each may decide to build one, and if Great Britain and the United States desired to insist upon the 5-5-3 ratio they might each very well lay the keels of two such vessels, with the result that the construction of one by Japan might call five others into being, It is apparent that Japan is being faced fairly and squarely with the responsibility of! making the world embark upon. a.naval armaments race, She and she alone has to @ecide what the naval future of the great Powers is to be. An acceptable assurance that she has no such intention as that suggested in the Notes would, at any rate for the time being, prevent any competition, but, the unofficial statement of an official of the Japanese Ministry of Navy is anything to go by, Japan will not give any assurance which would place her under exactly those same Liabilities which she left the London Naval Conference to avoid. It would indeed be step back towards the ratio system which Japan resents as a yoke. There is still a way out if Japan is already committed, The American Note states that in the event of this being so it would be willing to discuss with the Japanese Government the question of tonnages and calibres to be adhered to in the future, providing that such consultation would be concluded by May 1, It is apparent, however, from all that has occurred in the past that nothing will satisfy Japan except the "common upper Limit," or, in other words the substitution of naval parity for the 5-5-3 ratio under the Washington Treaty. That the other Powers are still as unlikely to accept now as they have been in the past, and it is more than a little doubtful whether any settlement of the matter can be reached along. these Lines. There is no reason in the world why Japan should receive parity, for she has neither the possessions abroad nor the long. ea lines to protect which is the case with the other Powers. Her navy from the point of view of defence is adequate for that purpose, and a decision to, build to higher limits can only be taken as a sign tf an aggressive policy which the signatories to the. London Naval Treaty cannot afford to ignore. With all that Japan is at present committed to, she is not 50 well placed as either Great Britain or the United States to enter into the competition which appears inevitable if Japan adheres to what appear to be her present intentions, and even now itis tobe hoped that she will modify liber naval policy, for the only danger of aggression which she might ever run will be of her own causation,

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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