With the German press and radio continuing its campaign of hate against the Swedish, the familiar old process of bringing about an atmosphere in which the long expected invasion of Sweden will receive some shadow of justly fication is being carried out. The consensus of opinion seems to support the view that an attack upon Sweden is now only a matter of a few days, some observers going the length of actually naming a date upon which such a move is to be expected. It is indeed difficult to see how Herr Hitler, having gone so far in this gamble in the Scandinavian peninsula, can now hold his hand. Quite obviously he is not obtaining what he set out to secure, through Norway, for the port of Narvik is closed to Swedish iron ore exports and the only chance of getting such supplies during the summer will be through the Swedish port of Lulea; which should be freed of ice by the end of next month. With Lulea in German hands the Reich would, providing the Swedish failed to destroy the mines, be able to command a regular supply of ore throughout the summer, though it would be necessary for the Germans to recover control of Narvik to ensure that similar supplies would be available during the winter. Sweden, with a fleet consisting of eight coastal defence battleships, two cruisers, one aircraft carrier, sixteen destroyers and a similar number of submarines, should be able seriously to impede, if not actually defeat any German attempt to seize the Aaland Islands controlling the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia, while on land its well equipped and substantial army should be able to render effective assistance to the Allied forces in their endeavour to bring Herr Hitler's Scandinavian venture to the inglorious end hoped for it. In this connection the comment by the Stockholm correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph" is not without interest. The naval actions which have taken place between the Allied and German fleets have led to the in-fiction of grave losses on the Germans. The German Navy, built for the express purpose of maintaining domination over the Baltic, is no longer of sufficient strength to be able to do so. It is no longer mistress of that stretch of water, and cannot expect to support with naval power an invasion of Sweden, while what naval force still remains to her is necessary for the maintenance of the precarious lines of communication between Germany and southern Norway, and the possibility is that any invasion of Sweden would be across waterways which could be easily and quickly traversed. Should Germany seize the Aaland Islands which dominate the entrance to the Gulf of Finland it will be interesting to see what the Russian reaction will be. Such an occupation would serve very greatly to offset the dominating positions the Soviet has secured for itself in the Baltic and might in certain circumstances be a positive danger to the Russian position in the region of Petrograd. It is not suggested for one moment that Herr Hitler contemplates hostilities against Russia, but there is evidence of a cooling of the recently inspired affection between the two countries and a greater disposition on the part of Herr Hitler to woo Rome again. Of one thing there can be the completest certainty; if it suits Herr Hitler's book to disregard Russian intentions and wishes in the Baltic, no consideration of past or present understandings will for one moment deter him. He has already been disappointed as to the amount of material assistance he can obtain from Russia, and as the only friends he wants are those from whom he can obtain something, no consideration of Russian sentiments regarding the possession of the Aaland Islands will for one moment stop him from throwing overboard the very uneasy relationship with his partner in the crime of the rape of Poland.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.