The Archive · 1940

NECESSARY PRECAUTION

If there is any sign of betterment in the Mediterranean it must surely be the report, confirmed by circles close to the State Department in Washington, that Signor Mussolini has assured Mr. William Phillips, U. S. Ambassador to Italy, that he does not intend to modify Italian status as a non-belligerent for the time being. The announced decision of the British Government to divert British shipping from the Mediterranean can be taken either as a wise precautionary, step against being caught unawares, or as a broad hint to Italy that" Britain is by no means satisfied by the attitude of some of the Italian leaders and the Press. Thus while there is no reason to suppose Signor Mussolini is addicted to the prevarication of which Herr Hitler is so notoriously guilty, it has nevertheless to be remembered that dictators take their decisions swiftly. It may be accepted that Signor Mussolini means what he told the American Ambassador, but that by no means shuts out the possibility that at some future date he may suddenly decide to throw in his lot with Germany, and unless the British took such a step as they have taken, there was a possibility that an' imposing quantity of British shipping might be caught unawares and destroyed before the convoy system could be brought into operation. In the circumstances nothing could be more advisable than to reduce the number of British mercantile vessels in the Mediterranean to the minimum. That this will involve British shippers in very large extra expense cab readily be seen, but in times like these it is better to be safe than sorry, even if the safety has to be purchased dearly. Fortunately for the Allies the enemy submarine campaign against their shipping has been brought to complete, and abject failure, and days now pass without any losses reported either by U-boat action, or by mines, while the diversion of British shipping to routes round the Cape of Good Hope should permit it to carry on its activities comparatively without danger from any Italian action in the event of the country entering the war.

'A significant passage occurs in a Havas message from Washington to the effect that Signor Mussolini's decision was, amongst other things, due to the fact that Italy is not yet prepared, both from a military and psychological point of view, to enter the conflict on Germany's side. The impression is gaining ground that, while the Italian people would undoubtedly follow whatever lead Il Duce gives, they are still reluctant to enter into a conflict with the Allies. This is not to say that they are in any way pro-"Allies,.but rather. that they are not pro-'German, for it will be remembered that constantly, since the Rome-Berlin Axis was formed, reports have been current of the popular dislike in Italy of the union with Germany. That Germany is applying enormous pressure upon Italy may be taken for granted, and is endeavouring to show the Italian Government that the German air force is superior to the Allied navies in the North Sea and along the Norwegian coast. That has not yet been clearly demonstrated, and even if it should be, it is only because of the fact that British fighter aeroplanes cannot be used fully because of the long distances to be covered, and their inability to carry enough fuel to cross over to Norway, fight an action, and return to their home bases. It is consequently apparent to the world at large, and also to Signor Mussolini, that the Germans will have to make a much more imposing showing than they have up to the present to-prove the superiority of their air force, for in other theatres of war nothing of the sort has been shown to exist, the Allies being well able to give a good account of themselves. These factors would seem to be having their influence upon the Italian leader, for he does not yet appear to be convinced of the German claims. That would account for his sticking to his present equivocal attitude, though at the same time he is affording Herr Hitler moral assistance by means of demonstrations aiming at proving the solidarity of the Rome-Berlin Axis. To that Axis Signor Mussolini has been far more loyal than has his opposite number in Berlin, and that fact too may not be without some influence upon the present situation.

The manner in which Herr Hitler has in turn flirted with Soviet Russia, and Italy is also something which has to be taken into account by the Italians. At the commencement of the war all German affection went to Moscow, the Rome-Berlin Axis being in existence, which was all that could be said about it. Russia proving a disappointment, the wayward attentions of Herr Hitler have again returned to Rome, and while for purposes of his own policy Signor Mussolini must seek to create the impression that complete trust exists between the two govern ments, he is unlikely to commit himself too definitely until he is more certain than he possibly can be at the moment of the Reich's loyalty to the Axis. There is, it is plain to see, every reason why Signor Mussolini should move warily, and from that point of view there may be reason for believing his statement that there will be no modification of Italy's status in the near future. That does not, however, mean that when a change does come about the Allies are likely to have much preliminary notice and common prudence necessitates that every disposition possible should be made against the possibility of the situation deteriorating so grievously that war in the Mediterranean becomes inevitable. It is perfectly understandable that irritation should be displayed in Italy over the British decision, but only if Il Duce himself wishes should it lead to any change in British relations with Italy or in Britain's attitude towards questions of common. interest to both countries. The situation in fine is that Great Britain regards the behaviour of certain Italian leaders and the Italian Press as definitely threatening war. It has made several blunt representations to Rome on the subject, which have failed to bring about any real improvement, and the Italians cannot now complain if Great Britain, and ultimately her Ally take all the necessary steps to protect their position in the event of Il Duce deciding to enter into ihe war on the side of Germany. They most certainly do not intend to allow themselves to be taken by surprise, and cannot, LO any precautions against Cabinet and Norway The possibility of there being a crisis in the British Cabinet over the situation in Norway has always to be reckoned with in considering the situation, but that need not be anything which should cause any great anxiety. Ministries were changed in the last war without any disruption of the energy with which the various campaigns were prosecuted, and there is no reason to believe that anything of the nature "will occur on this occasion should such a step become necessary. Much will depend upon the statement which Mr. Chamberlain was to make to the House of Commons yesterday, and which was not available at the time these lines were written. There is in the situation no reason for alarm, The fact of the matter is that the Germans at present have the advantage in the air over Norway. It must be the policy of the Allies to wrest that from them. Again parallels are to be found in the last war. Command of the air passed from the Allies to the Germans on various occasions, and when that happened those who for the time being had lost it suffered heavily. The laying-out of aerodromes is a question of time even under peace conditions, and though during war greater speed is necessary there is always the interference of enemy aviation to be taken into account. It may be a slow business building up Allied superiority in the air over Norway, for the obstacles are great They are not insuperable, and with the determination which inspires the Allies it may be expected that the work will be persevered with until the superiority which the Germans now possess is taken from them. Considering the disadvantages under which the Allied troops are operating, nothing but the highest praise can be given them for the manner in which they are continuing the struggle. If it, is necessary to further their efforts by a reformation of the Cabinet it is not believed that Mr. Chamberlain will hesitate for one moment to do so, for no man is more bent on prosecuting this struggle to the bitter end than he is. That might even lead him to include in his Cabinet men With whom in other circumstances he would prefer not to work.

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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