The Archive · 1938

GREAT STATESMANSHIP

Towards the end of last week an observer of political trends in Europe made the remark that nothing short of a miracle would prevent war in that part of the world before another ten days were out, and on Wednesday night it looked as though his prognostication were on the verge of proving true. Though at the close of that day the situation seemed to have bettered somewhat, it was still desperate enough to arouse the deepest anxiety, and grave forebodings as to what yesterday would bring forth. With the Sudeten Germans and the Czechoslovakian Government at arm's length and negotiations brought to a deadlock, with disorders involving Sudetens, Communists and Czechs, in which the last named appear to have been getting the worst of the argument, there was every danger that some one incident or another would be the spark to set the whole powder magazine ablaze. Unfortunately that latter consideration still has to be reckoned with, but from the point of view of Anglo-French and German positions in the matter a definite change for the better took place when it was announced that the British Prime Minister, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, had asked to be allowed to visit Herr Hitler, and the latter had replied in terms of such cordiality as to make such a unique event possible. It is true that for some years past Cabinet Ministers, and particularly the Foreign Secretary, have been on their own missions abroad, but this is surely the first instance, when the British Premier has left the United Kingdom in a time of grave crisis for the purpose of seeking to negotiate peace on the very eve of war. If there ever were any doubt as to the greatness of Mr. Chamberlain, this startling innovation, as remarkable for its courage as for its vision, must convincingly prove it. Mr. Chamberlain's first venture as Prime Minister into the realms of foreign policy, namely the Anglo-Italian accord, even now in a state of suspended animation, has not proved up to the present to have justified the risks which he assumed in making it with Signor Mussolini. He has consequently been much criticized for the departure from normal policies, and there was some indication that he was losing support in the Commons even from the party from which he had every right to expect it.

What led Mr. Chamberlain to make so dramatic a gesture is not at present made clear. It is possible that, despite the very definite statements which have been communicated to Germany, and to the world press, the belief of Herr von Ribbentrop, that Britain would not fight as the last resort, might have still found some supporters among Der Fuehrer's advisers. It would have been a tragedy if that misconception had been allowed to prevail in Berlin, or at Berchtesgarden, and, if through the ordinary channels of representation such assurances failed to carry the conviction it was desired they should, the best thing to do was for Mr. Chamberlain and Herr Hitler to meet face to face. It is unprecedented. It makes demands upon a man who is by no means young, has only recently recovered from indisposition, and one who is unaccustomed to flying. The display of moral courage Mr. Chamberlain has given—a moral courage which inspired him to strike out a new line vis-à-vis of Italy, despite strenuous opposition,—must reinforce belief in the strength of his leadership, and it is not sir-prising that this strange development, on his initiative should have secured for him the worldwide blessing which is now being bestowed upon it. Apart from the courage behind it, this new move is an adroit piece of diplomacy. This journal has repeatedly referred to the fear that Herr Hitler might have found himself, by reason of his own statements, and those of his followers, in a position from which it would be impossible to retreat without some impairment of domestic prestige. Mr. Chamberlain's move has presented him with an opportunity of ünding, even at this late hour, reasons why he may still hold his hand without any such loss. Obviously the meeting of these two leaders, should afford them a better opportunity of clearing away misunderstandings and cumbersome antagonisms than the voluminous exchange of communications which are so often capable of creating wrong impressions.

But if Mr. Chamberlain fails what then? Obviously the situation would be no worse than when he made the overtures which have led to this visit. Yet he will have shown the lengths to which Great Britain and France,—for the visit is undertaken with the foreknowledge and consent of the latter,—are prepared to go in order that the peace of Europe shall not be so fatally disrupted. On the other hand it seems to be the very last of quite a substantial list of concessions which have been made during the past few weeks; for it must be remembered that, as each concession has been made by the Czechoslovakian Government under Anglo-French pressure, Sudeten demands have been increased until the Czechs are prepared to fight rather than give in any more. If Mr. Chamberlain is able to induce Herr Hitler to persuade Herr Henlein to modify his demands to the acceptance of Prague's latest concessions as a basis of negotiation,—a basis which, unfortunately has been summarily rejected by the Sudeten leader,—war will be averted, and a new opportunity secured for working out some formula which may secure the peace of Europe. If he fails to do so, he will have done everything possible, short of bringing about that complete surrender to the Sudeten demands which Dr. Hodza has already emphatically rejected so many times, in the interests of European peace, and there will then be no longer any question as to what responsibility will remain on Anglo-French shoulders. There will be no misunderstandings such as those which it is alleged precipitated the struggle of 1914-18, no opportunity of contending that British sins of omission were responsible for the new catastrophe, and the responsibility for what is to happen will have been set fairly and squarely on the shoulders of those who, up to the present, have contributed so little towards an amicable settlement of this crisis. Then, if it comes to a choice between the policies of Mr. Chamberlain and Herr Hitler, probably History will hold to the judgment of Martial:—

Nolo virus, facili redimit qui sanguine famam; Hune vole, laudari qui sine motte potest, Hongkong's "Black-out"

Hongkong is not so far distant from'England in atmosphere for since he introduction some time ago of the air raid precaution scheme and the appointment of a special officer to direct it the same peace-time trials and drills to meet emergencies are making the Colony extremely "air raid minded." The third "black-out" when the Colony and the mainland were plunged into darkness to defeat hypothetical bombers was held a few days ago with a great deal of success in spite of the difficulties one might expect in dealing with such a population. From the reports of the officer in charge of the scheme and Col N. M. Irwin, G.$Ol, the result was good and there was almost a complete "black-out," Hongkong's famous peak known all over the world for its beauty of illumination at night sharing in the scheme with the humblest sampan in the harbour, whose flickering light was extinguished. As a matter of fact, a special tribute is paid to the sampans for their general ce-operation in the observance of the test which shows how thoroughly the appeal must have been obeyed, The two previous experiments differed from the third in the conditions of application but from the reports the latest more approximated conditions to be expected in a real attack. It was based on a period of preparation for extinct tion or screening of lights, surprise to test speedy fulfilment, and the test of the warning system. To quote Col Irwin:

The black-out was a success. The people, almost to a man, traffic, public and private. establishments such as docks, military barracks and so on, obscured their lights with great speed....As an actual comparison with the February black-out I would say that the Colony was more blacked-out than on that occasion The rapidity with which the black-out took effect was very gratifying and showed that the people had studied the A.R.P.O's instructions and were on their toes.

There were some criticisms chiefly in regard to forgetfulness and the use of paper on lights which did not produce a sufficient degree of obscurity. Owing to bright moonlight, searchlight signals were not a suetes and the dimming of private lights fell within this category. An important discovery was the possible use of traffic lights by "enemy" airman. A few odd lights in a darkened area are sometimes advantageous for they help to bewilder the aerial attacker whose bearings are missing, but in regard to traffic lights Col. Irwin stated that these were the most noticeable feature and no better guide to the airman could be conceived than the movement of traffic lights along roads. In future, it appears inevitable that all traffic must stop and lights extinguished. Hongkong is accumulating a useful fund of experience and knowledge by these air raid experiments, Unfortunately, owing to the weather it was not possible to apply the real test to the last "black-out." namely, aerial observation, but the common-sense basis of these efforts is not to be [underestimated in these uncertain times.

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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