Interest in the Far East and in London will undoubtedly centre today upon the Anglo-Japanese negotiations on the subject of the Tientsin blockade which are expected to open this morning. At least it is to be hoped that' the negotiations will solely concern that particular matter, though there are indications that the Japanese Government contemplates extending the conferences to: a discussion' of the British policy regarding the Chiang Kai-shek regime, and to make the settlement of that issue in the Japanese favour a preliminary essential for the conduct of further negotiations concerning Tientsin. That view is supported by the news from Tokyo reporting that the Japanese Cabinet held a meeting on Thursday at which the Japanese policy was decided upon, whereafter its decision was communicated to the Emperor, the significance of this being to give it a degree of finality, which it might not otherwise have. It is reported that the Cabinet has decided upon the following points:—(1) That Great Britain be requested to break with her "pro-Chiang Kai-shek and anti-Japanese policies, which are responsible for the current Tientsin issue," and (2) That Great Britain show her sincerity by cooperating with Japan in political and economic fields as well as in the maintenance of peace in the British Concession at Tientsin. These demands are to some extent reinforced by the whipping up of hysterical mass demonstrations clearly arranged for the purpose of indicating to Britain how definitely the Japanese populace supports the demands of their government, and the placarding of Tokyo with anti-British posters. All this is mere stage-setting, as is much of the comment appearing in the Japanese Press, for the purpose of creating an atmosphere in which nothing short of the surrender of Great Britain is to be demanded. There will doubtedly be given definite proof to the Japanese that there is a very wide gap between the desire and its fulfilment, and if the Japanese fancy that the British attitude will be one of abject compliance they are likely to receive a very complete surprise.
If the decision of the Cabinet is as it is reported, and there is unfortunately little reason to believe that its views have been misrepresented, its intention is obviously not io discuss the Tientsin affair with a view to its adjustment, but to make this point subordinate to the major issue of Britain's attitude towards the Chinese Government.
What are the facts? They are quite simple, and can be most briefly set forth. Japan, a signatory of the Nine Power Pact which provided that the Powers concerned should assist China: to work out her own salvation, has broken that Pact, has committed acts in China which are directly contrary to the spirit of that agreement, and indeed serve to thwart it, and is now preparing to demand that Britain shall not only cease to give that support as a neutral to China which she is not only entitled to give but morally bound, but shall by ce-operation with Japan in political and economic fields become an accessory after the fact of Japan's breach of Treaty. Let there be no mistake about it. Whatever Britain has done with regard to China during the past two years, she has been perfectly entitled to do, and that has no more entailed a breach of neutrality than the supply of munitions of war by the United States to China and Japan, or the similar action which Germany has taken with regard to China despite her commitments to Japan. Indeed the argument can be taken a step further. If Great Britain were to accede to the Japanese demands zs they are set out above, she would in fact be departing from the neutrality which she has preserved, and would indeed become. Japan's accomplice. In the circumstances it cannot be wondered at that more than a little pessimism is being shown in London, as well as elsewhere concerning the prospects of a satisfactory result emerging from these negotiations. That pessimism arises from the fact that the Japanese appear to have the idea that they have but to make demands for Great Britain to acquiesce, but in that they are hopelessly mistaken. Great Britain does not enter these negotiations without any talking points on her side, and to believe anything to the contrary is to betray a complete ignorance of Great Britain's determination and the resources she has at her disposal.
The Japanese position is not difficult to understand. After two very unproductive and costly years of adventure in China there is very little to show for ft. China has not Been beaten to her knees, and seems to be a very long way from it. With admitted prospects of years more fighting before the "China Incident" is brought to a conclusion those who committed the Japanese to so reckless an experiment must have something to show, and a diplomatic victory over Great Britain would be better than nothing, even though it would not end hostilities. The Theasure of the desperation of the Japanese is to be found in the degree of their vehemence, and if behind this facade of clamour there is some anxiety lest the negotiations come to naught by the refusal of the British Government to accept the Japanese terms, it is not to be wondered at. The danger of these negotiations lies in the fact that, if they are so broken off, the second state will be infinitely worse than the first, and the further deterioration of what is already a very bad position is the only thing which could then be expected. That would seem to be inevitable if the. Japanese approach these negotiations in the frame of mind which the cables from Tokyo suggest togbe the case, and it will be only by the exercise of the greatest patience and restraint that it will be possible to take the conferences very far. That, however, is a restraint which is to be required from the Japanese every bit as much as the British, and on the part of the former. it will have to be found in the Moderation of the demands which they put forward. If they turn out to be such as have been indicated the unavoidable impression will be that the Japanese never intended that these conversations should succeed. The other Third Party Powers who must ultimately be concerned with the results of these talks will undoubtedly watch them with the utmost concern, for the issue which is being forced on Great Britain closely affects them; it involves not the fate of British interests in China alone, but of all other foreign Powers, even those who at the moment profess to support the Japanese.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.