The communique mentioned that] the French and British Ministers took the opportunity to discuss certain Jquestions on the agenda of the League Council.
Among these, it slated, were Swiss neutrality and Abyssinia. "Ax to the Tatter, It might be assumed that it} wax not in the mind of either Gov-jemment to suggest at Geneva that! the League Powers should go back] upon any judgment or expression of principle to which in the past they might have subscribed.
Whatever action might be taken at the Geneva Council meeting—and the looks had shown that the French and British points of view and intentions this regard were identical—would be inspired solely bf the necessity fof recognizing the realities of the situation, the communique pointed out.
So far as the British Government was concerned, recognition de jure! of Italian sovereignty in Ethiopia was linked by and through the terms of the recent Rome agreement to the situation in Spain, The matter which had loomed unnecessarily large in some press comment on the Anglo-French meeting, fand on which the Ministers had no diMiculty in recording an agreement, was the question of staff contacts.
At the time of the arrangement by which these contacts were established 1986, It was made clear from the British side that they could not and did not constitute any new obligations or commitments and doubtless: the British Ministers thought it proper to make this point again, Complications Simple and straightforward as. the matter "was—as the communique thowed—there was danger of its Leing complicated by ill-informed commentary. It was learned that, for {this reason, the Foreign Secretary see both the sentatives in London in order to make the position perfectly clear.
Central Europe and, in particulas the problems facing Czechoslovakia were the main subject of yesterday's conversations.
"The French thad precise Treaty obtigations regarding Czechoslovakia and the position and interest of Great Britain. in this. same versations were deeply concerned tu see an orderly and peaceful solution found for the dificullies arising in this part of Europe.
The British Ministers were understood to have again insisted that, while anxious and willing when the occasion required to lend the full influence of the British Government ton the side of peace, they could not assume any further commitments than those already defined in Mr. (Chamberlain's statement.
More particularly, they undertook explore the possibility of exerting British influence in all quarters
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.