There are two ways of looking at an anniversary such as today's—the Double Tenth, the birthday of the Chinese Republic. There are undoubtedly those who will aver that never in the history of post-imperial China has this country experienced so depressing a day, while there are others who will contend that despite the gloom, which has to be admitted, never was there a more promising occasion; And neither outlook is completely right nor wrong. A survey of a thab of this country, showing how much of if the Japanese have overrun,—but not yet effectively occupied,—must inspire a feeling of despondency amongst Chinese. So much has passed into the hands of the Japanese invaders, so much has been alienated, even if only temporarily from the control of its own people. With but few exceptions the history of the campaign in China since the last national day has been one of successive military defeats. That was, perhaps, inevitable, for massed against the infinitely better ined and equipped Japanese forces, were the Chinese, whose chief armament was an undying.devotior to their country, weak enough physical armour against the material forces which have been arrayed against them. With such equipment the Chinese have for nearly fifteen months fought what amounts to a rearguard action,—with all the depressing eficet such should have on national morale,—with a stubbornness which has amazed and continues to amaze foreign observers. They have attained a certain, and by no means unimposing degree of success. The short campaign, which at its commencement was hoped by the Japanese would bring the Chinese Government to its knees, has been transformed into a long one, the end of which does not yet appear to be in sight: the Japan-timetable has been time and again yed by the fighting ability of the comparatively poorly fitted Chinese troops, and Japanese military commitments in China have been multiplied to an extent, which, it is fectly apparent from Japanese utterances at the commencement of hostilities, was never anticipated. Thus, though the Chinese have to accept the story which a survey of the map conveys, and it is indeed a gloomy one, they have the satisfaction, for whatever it is worth, of. knowing that from a military of view they have acquitted themselves well against great odds.
Thus the pessimist needs to readjust his appreciation of the values disclosed in the present military situation. Looking at it from the optimist's point of view, it has to be admitted that the chief values to be taken into consideration are in the main spiritual.
From 1911 to 1927 despite the success of the revolution, the prevalent disunion was clear indication that whatever a large number of Chinese might have though concerning the continuance of the imperial regime, the country was neither republican in outlook nor imbued with a wholesome national spirit. It is doubtful whether at any time the Chinese paid much more than lip service to the republican ideal, but with the establishment of the National Government, there was evidenced the commencement of the growth of a national spirit, demonstrated largely by outbursts of xenophobia, catholic in its application, until Japanese policies in China centred. it against themselves. Misdirected though that tendency undoubtedly was, it was the glimmerings of the instinct of nationalism which has been brought into full efflorescence during the past fifteen months. Today the Chinese have been welded into a common bondage owing fo an external influence, and there can be no denying the fact that the Chinese are at the present moment more conscious of themselves as a nation than they have been for a very long time past. That is a very important psychological factor to be taken into account when endeavouring to forecast future tendent cies. The Japanese cannot hope to secure complete success until they have imposed their will upon the Chinese, and so long as military achievement fails to impress upon the Chinese any realization of the supposed futility of their struggle so long will they have failed of their purposes. The territory which they have overrun cannot be said to be theirs until they have been able to secure the peaceful ce-operation of its inhabitants, and, judging from the reports available, the Japanese at the present time are far from bringing about what is for their purposes a very necessary state of affairs. They may be able to do it eventually, but that will not be possible until there is borne in upon the masses of the Chinese the utter useless of further resistance.
That has not been done up to the present. Despite a few whisperings, there is nothing to indicate that Chiang Kai-shek does not still hold the imagination of the Chinese people, nothing to suggest that the original inspiration which he gave them has been to any great extent diminished. The hope has been expressed that with the fall of Hankow the situation in this respect may be changed.
There is that possibility, but, as the fall of Nanking and Hsuchowfu failed to effect such a change, so may also the capture of Hankow, for against such a loss the Chinese have been prepared for months. Much has been made of the Japanese contention that once Hankow has been lost the Chiang Kai-shek regime will amount to nothing more than al provincial government in status, It is true that the dimensions of the territory in which! the fiat of the Chinese Government runs will have been still more reduced, but in matters such as these it is fallacious to endeavour to! estimate the value of a government merely by the superficies it may control. So long as the Generalissimo continues to command the loyalty and obedience of the Chinese in the manner he has done during all these months of national suffering, so long will he continue fo head the government of the Chinese people. He will be no less a figure in the struggle of the Chinese against Japanese domination, than was Sun Yat-sen in the first fight against the imperial regime and latterly against that of the war lords which disappeared with the ascendency of the National Government. It is consequently in ihe spiritual values of the race that the redemption of the Chinese is to be found, and, so long as those are not influenced by material reverses, the Japanese. may be regarded as still a long way from ultimate success. That is shown in conditions in areas which are now apparently under Japanese control, and: so far as it can be seen at present to the huge cost of the present campaign must eventually be added the large expenditure necessary to maintain military gains as fruits of victory. Thus on a national anniversary celebrated under such gloomy conditions as is this, the Chinese convinced of the excellence of their cause, determined upon a resistance which is remarkable for negative successes completely in line with the Chinese genius, may not even now regard the outlook as too desperate.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.