Aug. 22.
The declarations issued by the British and Japanese Foreign Offices on the subject of the deadlock in the Tokyo negotiations put the points of view of the two nations with the utmost clarity, the former in particular clearly demonstrating that the present failure arises wholly from the Japanese attitude regarding the inclusion of items in the programme of much wider aspect than was ever contemplated by Great Britain when entering into the conversations, It was clear from the various statements made by the hundred and-one Japanese spokesmen, who have aired their views on the subject, and the opinions set forth in the Japanese Press that matters more far-reaching than the local issues involved in the Tientsin dispute would be put forward, but Great Britain had to enter into the negotiations on the original demands which were of purely local importa ance. It was as the talks progressed that the intelligent anticipation of the Japanese spokesmen, and the press came to be justified, though it must be emphasized that Britain could only deal with the various de~ mands as the Japanese raised them, and it was not until the demands for the hand~ ing over the Chinese dollars in the various Chinese banks in the British Concession, and the banning of Chinese National Currency from circulation had been put forward official ly that it was possible for Britain to make plain her stand upon these points, The original scheme of the Japanese was to bring the British representatives to the conference table to deal with issues upon which Britain could make unilateral decisions, involving no rights of other third party neutrals, and as the negotiations progressed, to put forward the wider demands in the hope that, rather than Jet the conference collapse, Britain, would make those concessions which were the real Japanese objective, Those concessions involved the rights of others and the only correct stand which could be adopted with regard to them is the one upon which Whitehall has. decided, and that it would make that decision was a foregone conclusion, It would redound neither to Britain's honour nor to her states~ manship if she had betrayed the rights of other nations in China for the purpose of removing the inconvenience which the present unfortunate relations with Japan entail, Looking back it would seem that Whitehall went just as far as it rly could, The Craigie-Arita formula was a matter-of-fact recognition of the existing state of affairs, and a re-enunciation of that neutral ity which Great Britain has always sought to maintain in China during this present conflict. From that the purely local Tientsin issues were reached. 'Tokyo, after having refused to furnish it, supplied that extra evidence which it claimed it had against the four Chinese accused of complicity in the murder of the Chinese Customs Superintendent, and the Law Officers of the Crown decided' that a prima facie case had been made out against them. Their ultimate fate is now before the British Courts, and does not permit of comment at this juncture, but the development is referred to as cleatly demonstrating two things,—one, that this particular issue need never have become so acute had the Japanese authorities done earlier what they were subsequently obliged to do to gain their point, namely, produce this additional evidence when they were asked to long before the idea of a conference was broached, and, second, that the British authorities when in receipt of that evidence gave it that proper consideration which had always been promised it, The reasonableness of the British attitude was further shown by the manner in which they approached the Japanese demands in connection with the suppression of terrorism and ce-operation with the Japanese authori ties in this respect. The exact terms of this part of the agreement have not been divulged, but the fact that an arrangement equally acceptable to the British, and the Japanese, without infringing upon British rights in the Concession, could be reached is yet another definite proof of the accommo dating spirit in which Great Britain entered into these negotiations, But the Japanese appetite grew with eating, and as the local issues were thus successfully disposed of, the other demands were made which had already been adumbrated in the manner mentioned, whereupon the real Japanese objectives and the principal obstacles to agreement were officially and simultaneously divulged, They amounted in fact to a demand that Great Britain should do what Mr, Chamberlain had very definitely stated only a few weeks before it would never do, namely, change its foreign policy at the dictates: of another Government, and, directly the Japanese demands were made, it became obvious that, unless the attitude' they denoted. was radically changed, there was very little hope indeed that the Tokyo Conference could ever result in. success, Tt was not merely a question of asking Great Britain to modify her policy with regard to China, (Continued on page 311, col. 2)
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.