By securing Russian agreement to a nonaggression pact Herr Hitler has secured an outstanding diplomatic victory which may have a profound effect upon the present situation in Europe: It does not, however, justify any of the panic which has been displayed, nor the acceptance of any gloomier views than those which had prevailed up to the time the announcement of this new development was made. The advantages to both parties resulting from this pact are manifest, and though the ground appears for the moment to be cut from under the feet of Great Britain and France, the ultimate results should not prove so -disastrous to them as first impressions would seem to convey. Germany under this arrangement would appear to be certain of Russian neutrality in the event of a European war, so long as Russia was not menaced through German activities in the Baltic States. This neutrality would ensure for Germany a supply of foodstuffs, and raw material, such as a neutral may rightly supply, and gives Germany the chance of being in a better position to fight a long war than otherwise she would have been, while from a military point of view Germany is relieved of the menace of Russian might on the eastern front, and will, therefore be able to pay closer attention to the democracies in the west. From the Russian point of view the advantages accruing are of similar importance, Germany ceases to be a menace on the western boundaries of Russia, who is consequently enabled to devote most of its consideration to Far Eastern problems as presented by Japan. It renders ineffective any Idea of Japan joining the Rome-Berlin Military Alliance, constitutes a rebuff to Italy which ardently sought Japan's inclusion in that alliance and to a very large extent weakens the strength of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Obviously when the most important partner in that tripartite agreement levelled against Soviet: Russian, has entered into a non-aggression pact with it, the positions of the other two partners are seriously weakened, and it may very well be that in serving his own particular needs Herr Hitler has sown the seeds of: disruption in the coalition of powers he has been sedulously building up.
It has been notorious for some time past that the German military command favoured fan out and out alliance with Russia, and that it was only Herr Hitler's personal opposition to such a scheme which prevented it being brought into being. By entering into this non-aggression pact he has made some concessions to the German military, for while st cannot be said that there is any real chance of a reconciliation between the ideologies for which the two nations stand, the half loaf of non-aggression is better than no loaf of military alliance. It is still somewhat carly accurately to assess the effect of this striking development upon Poland, but it should be remembered that this decision renders certain what was always a possibility until the contemplated British-French-Russian military alliance had been signed. There was always the possibility that in the event of war arising over the Polish question Great Britain and France would have to fight the Axis Powers alone, and though this nonaggression pact definite removes the possibility of Russia being a military partner with the Entente, it does not create a military situation which has not already been anticipated. There is, however, the possibility that Poland may weaken in its determination to resist Germany's demands. It is not very great probability, for it is clear that the reincorporation of Danzig within the Reich, and the seizure of the Polish corridor would give Germany such an economic stranglehold upon Poland, that were it carried into effect Poland as a separate nation might very well cease to exist. That is a contingency which the Poles in their present temper may not be disposed to accept, for, if they did, it would amount to committing national suicide, and if it is found in the days to come that there has been no modification of Poland's will to resist, it should be an occasion for no very great surprise. Should she decide that way then Britain and France stand just as much committed to go to her assistance as ever they were, and, while at first blush it might seem that Germany is in a better position than she was before, that improvement may in the long run prove more apparent than real.
If the general result of this German-Russian agreement strengthens Herr Hitler's hands for the moment, it weakens the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis, destroying any chance of Japan reaping any~benefits from entering into a military alliance with Germany and Italy, and constituting a rebuff to the latter which has been anxious to bring about such a coalition. It is quite obvious that, if Japan can expect no assistance from Germany, bound by a non-aggression pact, in the event' of hostilities breaking out between Russia, and Japan in the Far East, there is no point in entering into such an alliance, $0 that the position of the three adherents to the Anti-Comintern Pact now stand in the following relationship with each other Germany in military alliance with Italy has signed a pact which clearly indicates that in the event of a Russian-italian dispute the latter could expect no military aid from the chief partner to the German-Italian Military. Alliance; Italy desirous of securing Japanese adherence to the same alliance finds now that Germany has no attractions to offer Japan for coming into the aggressive fold, while Japan may very well perceive a very definite disadvantage in the situation which has thus been created and recognize that the Rome-Berlin Axis has nothing valuable to offer for her inclusion in the tripartite military al-bane. The general set-up, therefore, has undergone a bewildering change for the minor partners to the—Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis, and if the conviction gains ground that Germany is playing her own game, regardless of her partners, or even heedless of what effect these developments may have upon them, it would seem, in the light of all that has happened, perfectly justifiable. It may be that Italy will in turn be persuaded to enter into a similar pact with Russia. The suggestion seems strange in the circumstances, but she has followed a long way down the German road during the past few years, and wherever the German chariot has been going Italy has not been far behind. If that indeed happens, what of Japan? She may find herself as completely isolated by her present would-be partners as she is by the democracies. Japan runs the -risk of being left very much alone. In the clrcumstances, therefore, too gloomy a view of. the situation should not be adopted. No new position has been created which was not possible at any moment, even if it was not re~ garded as probable, and if, as it is here suggested, Germany has betrayed her partners the ultimate result may prove to be an access sion of strength to the democracies.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.