The German monetary authorities would be handicapped from the out~ set by public distrust, engendered by years of inflation and by knowledge of the reichsmark's technical weakness. The German people as a whole fare still acutely conscious (and with Good reason) of the dire monetary consequences of the list war and, Jis aftermath, Anew emergency would create a widespread movement to buy goods, among those who feared the loss of their savings through a depreciation of the currency. Even now, the death penalty 1s unable to stop' currency smuggling altogether, though frontier supervision is rela tively easy; but all the resources of the Gestapo would be powerless, in war-time, to supervise all internal purchases and prevent the development of a widespread rise in prices. Even in the absence of a war, however, if" is becoming increasingly doubtful whether the German Go ernment will be able indefinitely to maintain its present rate of expendi ture. In view of the growing dif. culty' of raising additional funds by taxation or by. normal borrowing, a further steep rise in the Reichsbank may well be inevitable. hard 40 see how ni tional discipline can in itself prevent a rise in the cost of living, with its concomitant of a demand for higher wages. Refusal to grant increased wages, indeed, might well, i¢ It were persisted in, undermine the foundations of national discipline itself, fall back upon.
How long will the German Government be able to resist the inevit-fable consequences of its enormous public spending, accompanied by Bigantic budgetary deficits, during the last six years? For Jong, it may have been possible to conceal this effectively inflationary policy through the smooth working of an ingenious aystem under which money spent has found its way back to the authorltes.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.