While at the moment the cables are vague concerning pending developments in north Africa it is believed that, with the seasonal improvement in the weather, which is expected about this time of the year, serious fighting will soon occur. Apparently the Italians contemplate three movements, one out of Lybia along the coast by way of Sollum, where a highway makes movement fairly "easy, though it will be under the guns of the British Navy, the second from Kessala northwestwards towards Wadi Haifa, and the third along the Sudan-Egyptian frontier starting out from Taheida which is an Mahb base. This latter movement is designed effect a junction with the Italian forces operating out of Kassala, though it is believed that considering the enormous stretch of waterless desert to be negotiated the prospects of the movement of substantial forces may be, regarded as remote. Indeed interest will in* all probability centre upon the first two movements, the third being likely to amount to little more than a raiding demonstration.
When this campaign starts it will put an end to the comparative inaction which has existed in north Africa since the end of July, when the first phase of military operations in the Western Desert was cone cluded. In that phase the British did well, In a communique issued on August 6 the General Headquarters, Middle East, Stated:—
During this phase a small British Mobi Force of a few armoured fighting vehicle guns and a few companies of infantry ha completely dominated the Eastern Fronti area of the Italian colony of Libya in t face of an Italian force greatly superior numbers. Since the Italians declared war the British Empire they have lost on th front alone 818 prisoners (including a genera /16 guns, 15 tanks, 65 vehicles as well as "unascertainable number of killed and wound ed, and a quantity of arms, vehicles an of all sorts,"
'These British successes nave been due the high quality and sound training. the ab' handling and excellent equipment of th "famous regiments—of which our desert for is composed—the offensive spirit and hi moral of the Royal Air Force, who have a tacked the enemy relentlessly, and the ce tinuous patrolling of the sea by the Roy Navy, A further, and, perhaps, even mo significant factor is the complete unanimi as to the righteousness of our cause and ti absolute confidence in the outcome which i spires. all ranks and contrasts so marked' with the doubt and hesitation and lack of the Italians themselves as w as amongst the unfortunate Lybians in th army.
According to Headquarters how the second phase would develop was a matter of con-lecture, but it has since transpired that the Italians planned to capture British Somaliland which they did following the British evacuation. It is the third phase which is now developing. It is known that the Italians have large forces in Lybia. They will probably-want every man they can get there; for the same British communique from which the above extract was taken, states "As we know from evidence gained at Kassala and Moyale, the Italians. require a superiority. of more than ten to one before" they will risk an attack on a British position." This is not the enthusiastic outpouring of a propagandist, but the opinion of soldiers, whose very first lesson is never at any time to underrate an opponent. Since it was written substantial British reinforcements have arrived in Egypt, despite the much vaunted Italian naval supremacy in the Mediterranean, which apparently amounts fo a commanding view from the safety of Italian harbours.
1t is believed that the Italians, have accumulated very substantial reserves in north Africa, but the fact that the British Navy is able to maintain a blockade of the coast, renders the likelihood of any greet amount of additional supplies reaching thd enemy very remote. The Italians are able only to maintain a very precarious life-line with Italy itself, and their campaign will have to be conducted with what they have got on the spot. The British on the other hand are able to despatch reinforcements ana supplies and will continue to be able to do so unless the Italian Navy can come out into the open and destroy the British fleet, That they cannot hope to do by con: tinuously avoiding action. The situation it morth Africa can, therefore, be reviewe* with complete confidence in the ability or the British forces to deal with whatever movements the Italians may be contemplating. As the British headquarters said in their communique of August 6:—"If the attack does come it will not take us "y surprise for we have our plans ready meet it. But whatever happens we shal mot be deceived by the claims of Bari and Berlin, which doubtless will be as exaggerated and untrue as ever."
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.