Too much importance should not be attached to the alleged German official statement said to have been made to Japanese ts in Berlin to the effect that the invasion of Great Britain had been shelved. In the first instance, it is not clear exactly how official the utterance was, and, the second, the veracity of German statements, official or otherwise, has been such deciding upon a venture, which has si: bewitched his imagination ever since he rose power, It must be remembered that 2 2 tain has all along been Hitler's 82 if he fails to attempt it, it his technical experts have upon him the enormous in lives and material which involve.
is of more importance is the report that Hitler and Mussolini are to meet in the Brenner Pass for consultation, and there is naturally much speculation as to what they are to talk about, With all the conferences which have been recently going on between representatives of the two governments, it would have been thought that all possible topics by now have been exhausted. That does not appear to be the case. The announcement of the tripartite alliance incompletely failed to be im-It had been expected months in advance, and, so proved to be the dampest of squibs. It does not seem to have et much impression in either Italy or Germany, and the probability is that the leaders meeting for the purpose of 'a moral to face the fast approaching winter.
The Italian advance out of Libya is slow. Since he occupied Sidi Barrani, Marshal Graziani, the, Italian · commander-in-chief, has been content to seek to consolidate his position before venturing to attempt another advance which, will be much more difficult than anything he has achieved up to the present, Every step forward entails greater @ifficulties, ana he is obviously pursuing methods of extreme caution, realizing that with the British, when they choose to stand and fight him, may have a 8 effect on the course of the war.
at He may be reluctant; to enter into an ment which would lead to his defeat is understandable in view of the effect which such a reverse would have not only in northern Africa but in Italy itself, where, despite what all the official propagandists say, the war has never been popular. The British forces in that part of the world have been considerably strengthened since the collapse of France, and while the Italians are still reported to be numerically superior the balance has been substantially readjusted.
The great need for Italian caution in northern Africa may induce the Dictators one upon another venture through the to Syria. Reports concerning the Nazification of Rumania suggest that the path Ins already being prepared for some such movement. But even here there are great difficulties to be faced not the least of which are again the great distances which have to be Covered. That is an important factor when armies of present day size, and the enormous task of maintaining them in the field are taken into consideration. So long as the British Navy maintains control in the Mediterranean those difficulties will continue 4 to exist, and the prospects of the Italians 1 being able to wrest that command from the 4 British appear remote in the extreme. Indeed they do not appear to be at all willing to force the issue, and though their fleet does occasionally take the sea it manages to keep at a respectful distance from the British who would willingly give them battle. The conference at Brenner may bring forth some new decision, but it does not seem that the Dictators would be able to produce anything which has not already been anticipated, and to that extent discounted.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.