he exchange of American destroyers for British bases will probably he lucked upon when the history of the war comes to be written as the turning point in the American altitude from one of cautiously guarding its neutrality to one of paying little more than lip service to it. It was a transaction which the Administration approached with fear fand trepidation, one which it feared might arouse violent opposition from Congress, but once the plunge tad been taken and nothing, untoward had happened, it was encouraged to explore further possibilities along the same road, Ever since spring the desire of Great Britain to obtain some of "the aver=age American destroyers was known to the Administration. For several years the wish of the American Government to acquire leases on British insular possessions in the New World had been unofficially discussed. Under normal conditions an American lease of a British base might have aroused alarm since indicated a confusion of interests which the isolationists would consider dangerous, When the proposal was made early in 1938 that the American fleet might like io use the newly created British base at Singapore, there was a shiver of apprehension in Congress which the Administration noted and, having noted, hurriedly declined. The reason why Congress disliked the proposal that Singapore should be shared by the two navies was that the United States might be involved thereby in Far Eastern entanglements and ily security threatened rather than swfequarded. Acquisition or joint use of bases In the Caribbean and the North Atlantic would not involve the United States in any further danger than that which had threatencdl her and would, in fact, increase her ability tw meet that Urea}.
In the forefront of the Administration's foreign policy since the war began has been the problem of western hemisphere defence andthe ce-related problem of continental solidarity, Two independent contributions of the United States to these principles were the compulsory military service acts (one calling up the National Guard, the other esta~ blishing a compulsory military service aystem) and the establishment of the $500,- (000,000 fund which the Export-Import Bonk could use to cushion the shock of wartime dislocations of trade. Thus, from the point of view of funds or fighting men the United States made itself ready to match any threa-{ening steps taken by the totalitarian powers fu the western hemisphere.
Phere were two, gaps in this hemisphere defence scheme, The first wax that the Dominion of Canada had never been in eluded within ity scope. The second was that with the main body of the United States fleet in the Pacific, the Atlantic approaches were inadequately defended. On August 16 the President announced that he was negotiating directly with the British Govern= mont for the lease of naval and air bases, particularly on those British islands which Were in the Panama Canal aver and that he was also negotiating with Canada problems of western hemisphere defence. Both the White House and the State Depart~ iment insisted that the negotiations with Britain for the Joint use of naval and alr facilities did not imply any: common policy:
There were objections also to the negotia~ tions with Canada. Canada was a belligerent and. the United States a neutral, anxious above all things to Keep war from her own shores and from the western hemisphere. here hnd even been some isolationists, such ax Colonel Lindbergh, who. had criticized wen for involving the New World in un-anger and bringing the threat of war closer to the shores of the Americas.
For some the British Government were anxious to keep the question of bases ind the question of destroyers it. They probably did not wish tom transaction appear to be a mere bargain, but wished the American publi feel that the bases were offered them in spirit of friendship and that the American lines to sell the destroyers was likewise A friendly gesture, not one undertaken obtain any advantage. But in taki slond, the British Government American opinion which doesn't consider there is anything sordid about a "Yankee trade" and rather liked to strike " good barxain and the American administration's own attitude towards the problem of defence.
At the time the destroyer sale was first branched, American opinion was still pessimistic about Britain's chances of success. The destroyer sale might not only weaken America's defences, but might add to the strength of the potential enemy if he gained possession of the British fleet. On the other hand, the acquisition of British owned bases in the North Atlantic would undoubtedly strengthen America's powers of resistance. If the bases were required as part of a joint transaction in exelange for destroyers, the total result would be to strengthen and not weaken America's ability t" meet any enemy.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.