The Japanese reply to the Notes presented by France, Great Britafn and the United States, requesting the reopening of the Yangtze to the shipping of their nationals, should come as no surprise to anyone, not even those who have professed belief in assurances which are so glibly given regarding third Power interests. It is a wholly unoriginal, and unconvincing document. Japan claims that the time is not opportune for the reopening of the river and gives five reasons in support of that contention. The booms constructed by the Chinese have only been opened sufficiently to permit the passage of military vessels, and the river there is fully occupied by Japanese shipping; large scale military operations above Hankow would be impeded if free navigation were allowed merchant vessels; Chinese guerillas fire on Japanese warships, and transports; Chinese troops were letting loose mines in the river, and considerable time would be required to remove them, and replace the navigation marks. That the booms have been removed sufficiently to permit the passage of Japanese vessels is ample proof that the breaches made are wide enough to permit vessels of other nationality to pass. The passage of foreign shipping up and down the Whangpoo for three months during the hostile ities last year did not impede Japanese activities in this area, and it will be readily conceded that the Yangtze is somewhat more capacious than the local stream. The contention that Japanese military vessels would be impeded has no foundation in fact. That Chinese guerillas fire on Japanese war vessels and transports has no bearing whatever on the subject. Firing on vessels passing up and down the Yangtze has been known for years past, and constitutes no more than what is accepted as a normal risk in this part of the world. It is admitted that the Chinese have been letting mines loose in the river, but if third Power neutrals care to take the risk of that on a waterway to the use of which they have very definite rights, it is entirely their business, and the solicitude of the Japanese in this respect, while it will undoubtedly be appreciated at its real worth, is entirely unnecessary.
It is immediately apparent that the reasons given for refusing perfectly proper requests are as flimsy as they are impertinent to the issue. They will certainly not amount to justification of the Japanese attitude. A Havas message from London, dealing with the reply states "It is believed here that Japan's intention is to restore traffic on the river only when Japanese traders have en-ürely won over the domestic market." As will be seen in another column this journal is in a position to state that that belief is entirely correct, and that at the present moment the Japanese authorities are keeping the river closed, while their mercantile nationals are actually carrying on an important import and export business in the areas denied to other people. Tens of thousands of tons of produce for export, and imported goods are passing up, and down the Yangtze under Japanese auspices, and for Japanese account. The cargoes are not war supplies, unless, of course. dried lilies, melon seeds, sandalwood, silk waste, piece-goods and feathers come within that category. Tobacco leaf may not be munitions of war, though possibly the 3,000 packages of general cargo. consisting of soap, candles, sugar, cigarettes, etc., landed by one vessel at Wuhu would come under that heading, the candles being undoubtedly used to light the troops io their slumbers. Another Japanese vessel handled in one return trip to a river port no less than approximately 23,000 packages of general cargo, and trade is being generally carried on with ports as far up the river as Kiukiang, as well as beyond. On one day at Wuhu at the beginning of this month three Japanese vessels brought in and took out cargoes amounting to over 28,000 packages, bags, baskets and bales, while four days later four additional Japanese vessels had taken the total of import and export trade dealt with up to no less than 47,000.
These are not instances in which Japanese ships carrying war supplies up river have Today, at long last, the Anglo-Italian Agree-mont, Which was signed on April 16 of this year, comes into force, and the formal restoration of better relations between the two countries becomes an accomplished fact. It is now Only to be desired that what has thus been done formally, will lead to a general improvement in the sentiment between the two nations, and the re-establishment of the old cordiality which existed. Of the Agreement it has been said that it is greater as a whole than the sum of its individual items, for it owes its value not so much to the separate promises as to the general determination on each side to achieve a lasting appeasement. Briefly the provisions of the Agreement compris (2) Reaffirmation of the Anglo-Italian Agreement of January, 1657, on the maintenance of the status quo in the western Mediterranean; (2) Exchange of military information concerning territories in and around the Mediterranean.
Recognition of the common interest in the independence and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, recognition of British protection over certain districts in southern Arabia, the rulers of which remain autonomous, and agreement mot to fortify the former Turkish islands in the Red Sca.
Neither to use publicity nor propaganda to injure the othe: Guarantee of British interest in the matter of Lake Tsana as an abiding intere Italian promise that natives of Italian East Africa shall not be compelled to undertake military duties other than policing and territorial defence.
Italian promise to assure British nationals in Italian East Africa free exercise of their religion and to examine the claims of missionaries.
The free use of the Suez Canal is guaranteed at all times to all Powers.
In the exchange of letters annexed to the agreement Italy declared readiness to withdraw Italian forces from Lybia until their strength is halved. Italy also declared she would join the London Naval Treaty of 1936 would withdraw from Spain, and denied she had any territorial or political aims in pain, nor did she seek economic privileges. Great Britain reminded Italy that "a settlement of the Spanish question" must come before the agreement as a whole enters into force, and promised to raise the question of the recognition of Italian Ethiopia at Geneva. It is apparent from the foregoing that with goodwill on both sides this agreement should prove a sure foundation for a fresh and lasting understanding, on terms of perfect equality, between Great Britain and the new Italy. It should at the very least put a period to the frictions, annoyances and mistrusts, the origin of which is quite clear and comprehensible but which have no quality of permanence and should be prevented from ever recurring again. The direct action taken in this matter by Mr. Chamberlain has resulted in the removal of all incompatible material issues between the two countries, and this Agreement sweeps away all those minor causes of friction which cease to be dangerous as soon as they are no longer exploited. That the Agreement represents some departure from the League of Nations will undoubtedly be regretted by some, but the decision enabling recognition of the Italian empire in Abyssinia was taken within the framework of the League, and is, therefore, not wholly devoid of the merit which critics would deny it. The coming into force of the Agreement will undoubtedly be welcomed locally by both the British and the Italian communities. Fortunately that tolerance which comes from closer acquaintance was not at any time decreased, and though the two nations might officially be at loggerheads the relations between the two communities here were happily not diminished in friendliness.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.