With the determination of Poland not to become the victim of "another Munich conference," and the reluctance of France to submit her quarrel with Italy to mediation, it seems as if the Pope's alleged proposal for a five Power conference to settle European affairs will fail. There never were any very great chances of its succeeding, if only because of the suspicion that even if such a conference were to be held, and satisfactory conclusions reached they would not have about them that degree of permanence without which that might prove to be a very temporary adjustment. Thus there is not only the difculty of reconciling divergent points of view, but also the deep fear that whatever settlements might be effected would not really bring the peace which is desired. It must be remembered that while there is probably no nation which desires war, there is growing up a set of conditions in which one school of thought regards war as inevitable, while the other merely hopes to avert it. The opinion of an unnamed German military correspondent, quoted in the latest e of Time and Tide" to come to hand is interesting in this connection "The great common aim of the Axis is world conquest, and this the expense of the present world position of France, and Britain. Germany, and Italy have invested the whole of their economic strength, the whole capital, and the whole of their working power in armaments. This national capital must at some time pay a dividend'; that is to say the A: must attain its aim of world conquest, or inevitably go bankrupt.
If for instance, during the next twenty months, it were impossible for either Hitler or Mussolini to make some new conquest. or ie gain some important political success in the international field, then it must be koned that, in the present feverish state of armaments, both German and Italian economy would be bled white, and both peoples might be led to a revolutionary crisis. But neither Hiller nor Mussolini will sit back, and surrender themselves to such a development. By this very fact the Western Powers are themselves challenged to combat unless they decide to wait until the o Dictators have attained such a strong position that they are able with good chance of success to make a direct attack upon the Western Powers (France and Britain)—aa action ich at this moment is not possihk for them It follows from the foregoing that at any rate for the time being the dictatorships still contemplate securing minor successes while building up their might for the final trial of strength, and that, though at the present time neither France nor Britain may be immediately menaced, their turn will come in time unless the Axis is confronted with a superior force which would deny the inevitability of war and, perhaps, avert it. Viewed in this light the slowness of the negotiations which are proceeding between Great Britain, and Russia must be regarded with some misgiving. There seems to be about the British approach to the Soviet a quality of hesitancy which does nothing but breed suspicion, and increase the reluctance of the Kremlin to accept those commitments which would put the possibility of a successful German attack upon Poland outside the realm of practical politics. The exact terms of the latest British offer to Moscow have not been published. If they are along the lines of the various reports which have come to hand it will be no cause for sur prise if this new approach fails to find favour in Russian eyes as is forecast. The suggestion that Britain should only call upon the Soviet after she herself is actually embroiled with Germany over Poland is in itself an evidence of good faith, but in the circumstances it is not sufficient.
What is required on the part of the Democracies is that same quality of forthrightness which is being displayed between the Dictators. It should not be impossible to arrange an alliance between Great Britain and Russia on similar lines to the understanding between Russia and France. Even more; it would be the most definite answer to German and Italian aspirations in the world if they were confronted with the definite fact that Great Britain, France and Russia were completely committed to a military defensive alliance embracing common action in defense of any of the smaller European nations threatened by aggression from either or both of the dictatorships. The only language which Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini understand is the speech of strength, and the strength of such a combination as that of Britain, France and Russia would be something which could not be possibly misunderstood.
It is part of-the German propaganda in Europe to suggest that whatever British statesmen say, they are really hoping that the supreme effort on the part of Great Britain can be avoided. The failure to introduce conscription was one of the arguments adduced in support of that contention.
Now that conscription in a modified form has been introduced that has gone by the board, but there is still every reason to believe that the amount of temporizing in which British leaders are indulging is responsible for the hesitancy, which Russia, and some of the other countries invited to join the anti-aggression pact are still displaying. It is easy to understand that in the days of British unpreparedness of only a few months ago it was impossible for Britain to exercise the degree of authority which it is now within her competence to do. It is not now quite so easy to comprehend why a greater degree of resoluteness is not being displayed. If an alliance with Russia is necessary nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of reaching one. If it is feared that the entering into wholesale commitments with Russia would throw Japan further into the arms of the Rome-Berlin Axis, what of it? There is no guarantee whatever that if Great Britain refrained from entering into a complete understanding with Russia, Japan would continue to maintain her present attitude towards the Axis. Indeed there is reason to suppose she would not, and that, at some time or other, she may still be persuaded to throw in her lot unreservedly with Italy and Germany: Fear that the worst may happen as a result of preparing for it should not prevent that action being taken.
It is not timorous policies which will save the world from an holocaust, but only the most resolute and determined insistence upon the necessity of making war so definitely unprofitable to those who may seek to be the aggressors which can ensure the continuance of the present very precarious peace. But a peace, no matter how precarious it may commence by being, still gives a chance for securing something more durable, but that chance must disappear if the most complete and energetic precautions, are not taken to make sure that aggression will fail, and fail disastrously for those who engage in it.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.