While the past week has been of very considerable interest in the Far East it is likely that this will be even more important in Europe. The next few days will decide whether it is possible for Great Britain and Russia to come to an understanding which will round out Mr. Neville Chamberlain's anti-aggression scheme. There has undoubtedly been displayed in the House of Commons and elsewhere very considerable irritation over the fact that an agreement with Russia has not already been reached. But there are indications that with the assistance of the French Government a reconciliation of the British and Russian points of view may still be possible without that "full dress military alliance" advocated by such people as Mr. Winston Churchill and Mr. Anthony Eden. That the Government's proposals fall short of a military alliance to Soviet schemes is the explanation given by Mr. R. A. Butler, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and it is because of this falling short of that element of reciprocity upon which the Kremlin seems to be so insistent that negotiations have been deadlocked for some few days. Out of the welter of speculation as to exactly where the points of view of the two governments differ so radically one fact emerges with considerable clarity. It is that Great Britain appears to be reluctant to join with Russia in guaranteeing the integrity of the Balkan States. The matter, of course, is a small one in the view of the British Government, while. Moscow undoubtedly believes that the threat which East Prussia holds out against Lithuania, Latvia and Esthonia is something upon which she should receive just the same guarantees as are required from Russia with regard to Poland and Roumania and ultimately Turkey.
Consequently the next few days will decide not only the success of the present deadlocked negotiations but also, quite possibly, the political future of Mr. Neville Chamberlain. The reluctance which he, and some other members of the Cabinet still have to a completely reciprocal military alliance with Russia is not shared by very important sections not only of his own Cabinet but of the House of Commons, and it is likely that should he fail in adding the missing cornerstone to the structure of collective security which he has built up in the course of the last few weeks, opinion in Parliament and out of it might force him to resign. It need not necessarily follow, unless he so advises the King, that a general election would ensue, for it is quite possible, taking all factors into consideration, that some other member of the present Cabinet, more willing to complete an alliance with Russia, would be able to command sufficient support not only from the Conservative party but, in this connection, possibly from the Liberal and Labour opposition, to control the House, and bring into being that instrument without which the democratic answer to dictatorial threats can never be complete. One of the chief factors which seems to have been operating in Mr. Chamberlain's mind is that with the alignment of Great Britain, France, Poland, Roumania and Turkey a sufficiently strong coalition has been effected to render the possibility of war more uncertain than it has been up to the immediate past. But those who are inclined to think differently from him look towards the enormous man-power which Russia possesses and the huge resources which in the event of a thoroughgoing military alliance could be placed at the disposal of the anti-aggression combination.
Thus while at the moment France and Great Britain with the seasoned troops of the secondary powers could put into the field nearly 15 million men as against the Italian and German combination of 8,500,000, the addition of the Russian forces would unite on the side of the democracies no fewer than 33 million men either under arms or in reserve, certainly the greatest potential array ever available for warfare in the history of the world. If this is true of the land forces it is equally correct of the combined resources of the anti-aggression system at sea and in the air. It will be seen from the foregoing that Russian assistance does not seem to be from a numerical point of view imperatively essential. But in the present state of the world, where he who is' not for a party is definitely against it, the inclusion of such a Power as Russia in the alignment of the democracies is vastly more important to the latter than for Russia to maintain a neutrality which might render available for the two dictator states those resources which could and should be reserved for those who might possibly have to fight them. This point of view has been consistently held by the French Government and has, as already has been pointed out, very considerable support in Great Britain. It is believed and devoutly hoped that at the next ordinary Cabinet meeting to be held on Wednesday it will be possible to announce that a complete understanding has been reached with Russia, for not only will it give to the smaller countries in the Balkans a greater feeling of security than they at present possess, but it will have brought together such enormous forces that the possibility of war should be driven far into the background. Failure to Teach an understanding, however, need not necessarily increase the certainty of war, though the fullest access of strength by the latter by as much as three times, is of course totally erroneous. No comparison of such costs is, of course, reasonable which fails to allow for the very material differences in the size and the population of the areas over which these respective Forces have jurisdiction, Making a comparison first of the size of the two areas, the area of the Settlement Proper is 8-2/3 square miles. If the Settlement External Roads Areas embracing an area of about 12 square miles (only the roads of which are, however, policed by the Settlement Police) are added to this, the size of the area policed by the Settlement Police Force may reasonably be assessed at three times that of the French Concession, whose area approximates only four square miles. Accordingly, purely on a cost-area basis, expenditure on the two Forces may be said to be ihe same. Employing a population basis to assess the respective costs, using the last official census figures of 1935 and 1936, the total Chinese and Foreign population of the Settlement, including the foreign population only of the Settlement External Roads Areas, is roughly 1,160,- 000. The total Chinese and Foreign population of the French Concession approximates 470,- 000. The result, once again, is to show that the policing responsibility of the Settlement Force, on the basis of population is, roughly stated, three times that of the French Concession. The sum of the impression deriving from the foregoing comparative analysis is, therefore, that, far from the Settlement Police costs grossly exceeding those of the French Police, a striking similarity between the policing costs of the two municipalities is demonstrated.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.