The debate in the House of Lords on Great Britain's foreign policy paid considerable attention to the situation of British subjects in China, and though much of the official comfort which Lord Halifax had to administer was of a decidedly icy temperature, some consolation is to be found in the fact that there is no intention of Great Britain receding from the position she has already taken up. Britons in the Far East are assured that the Government will devote all its efforts to the protection of British rights and trade here, will recognize no unilateral changes in treaties freely entered into by Great Britain and other nations; rumours concerning the alleged proposal to withdraw another battalion from Shanghai were denied, while the list of assurances wound up with one that Britain would not accept Japan's excuse of military necessity to justify actions detrimental to British rights, especially in places where military operations have ceased. One significant passage in Lord Halifax's speech was the reference to the "very formidable list" of incidents as reflecting the extent of the British stake in China. It not only does that. It reflects with very considerable plenitude of detail the manner in which British interests are being attacked by the Japanese in their often-declared determination to drive the British and all other foreign interests out of China. The Foreign Secretary then proceeded to deal with the fears of Lord Elibank that Japan was planning to seize the International Settlement of Shanghai on July 7 to mark the second anniversary of the commencement of the Sino-Japanese hostilities, and assured the noble lord that the Government had "not been indifferent to any one of these threats in any one of these directions." This is all very nice and would be much more satisfactory were there indications that the Government actually contemplated action in certain events beyond the mete registration of protests and the accumulation of further additions to the long list of incidents.
A review of all that has happened during the past twenty-three months does nothing to remove the impression that Great Britain in common with all the other Powers interested in China, have failed to take tilt positive action, which is better understood by the Japanese than all the formal representations in the world. The enormous patience which has been displayed,—enormous even when European difficulties are taken into account—has created amongst the Japanese an idea of weakness which it will be very hard indeed to dispel. It is in these continual endeavours on the part of Japan to see how far she can go without inviting some sort of retaliatory action, that a continual whittling away of British rights,—and other foreign rights as well, it must be remembered,—is in proges. What by the time these lines appear in print will prove to be the downright denial of British rights in Tientsin may have been set afoot. The question arises:—What is Great Britain going to do about it? The organization of a boycott of Japanese goods in Britain in connection with the China Campaign week is all very well, but it is neither an officially-inspired move, nor one that is likely to be at all effective in bringing home to the Japanese the intense British indignation over what is happening, and the determination of the British Government that in the ultimate event there will have to be a reckoning. That appears to have escaped the notice of the Japanese Government and its officials, or, if it has not, it is treated with that degree of contempt which permits spokesmen to describe the damaging of the American-owned Szechuen University as due to a bomb which had "gone astray." Parenthetically flits latest excuse seems reminiscent of one of those old melodramas "The Girl who took the Wrong Turning." If Japanese officials think they can fob off representations concerning Japanese wrongdoings by such puerilities, it is obvious that the time is rapidly approaching when they should be taught very much to the contrary.
For approximately two years the Britisl: Government has accepted, has had, perforce, because of preoccupations elsewhere, to accept such offhand explanations. It cannot, if it wishes to preserve much of its already-impaired dignity in the Far East, accept any such explanations if indeed the British Concession in Tientsin is molested in the way it is believed likely. It has been pointed out time and time again that there lies in the hands of Great Britain means of retaliation which can be used effectively in order to bring about a change in the Japanese heart. There may be some reluctance against using them for fear of further worsening relations between the two countries, but owing to the actions of Japan alone, it is contended that the situation is now so bad that a little more worsening cannot materially affect conditions. It is not suggested for one moment that Great Britain should resort to arms to vindicate her position in the Far East. There are other equally effective methods of dealing with the subject, not the least interesting of which is that, which was suggested recently, certain of the Empire ports should be denied to Japanese shipping. - The gesture of closing Singapore and Penang to Japanese shipping would in all probability have just that moral effect which would render the Japanese less eager to invite further reprisals by a continuance of their present pin-pricking policy. The subjection of Japanese trade to certain disabilities, along the lines adopted by Prési-dent Roosevelt with regard to German imports into the United States, might prove another means- of showing the Japanese Government that there are teeth behind the many representations which have been made to Tokyo on the subject of Japanese bad faith in regard to foreign interests in China. Such a weapon, which would strike a deadly blow, reducing Japans opportunity of obtaining even that small proportion of foreign exchange which she can still secure, and would be an economic blow to the country which would have behind it all the emphasis desirable in such a time as this. These do not exhaust the possibilities of bringing about sufficient pressure upon Japan to ensure that British rights shall be respected, but until something of the nature is done it cannot be expected that the Japanese will be prevailed upon to behave themselves.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.