While Soviet circles in London are confident that an Anglo-French-Russian mutual assistance pact is within sight, British circles in Moscow are not quite so optimistic, and in the absence øf positive information the man in the street is left guessing between the two opinions. It seems, however, clear that more progress has been made recently than was formerly the case, and there does appear to be some chance that an arrangement will be concluded before the situation it Europe is due to get worse. One of the difficulties attending the negotiations was the unfortunate circumstance under which they had to be opened, for from 1937 there appears to have been misunderstandings which aroused in the Russian mind more than a little suspicion of British good faith. When the Russian view was not taken by the Spanish Non-Intervention Committee in Joly of that year, M. Ivan Maisky, Russian Ambassador to Great Britain is reported to have remarked that the British were selling the. democracy of Spain, obviously because they would not go to her aid, but preferred to maintain a complete neutrality. Following the Austrian anschluss, M. Maisky conveyed a Note to Britain proposing a Conference of the Powers to consider joint action against aggressor nations. The proposal was rejected, Mr. Chamberlain replying that the Government were of the opinion that "the indirect but nonetheless inevitable consequences....must be inimical to the prospects of European peace." A few months later the Sudetenland had been given to Germany, though Russia had offered to fight and resist if called upon, Czechoslovala was' torn apart and Britain still declined as premature the proposal to hold a conference to devise ways and means of halting aggression. These rebuffs logical enough so long as there was any faith in the Munich accord, from which Russia had been excluded, were not conducive to the greatest cordiality when it was belatedly recognized that what Russia then offered was indeed the best method of meeting any threat of aggression which might be contemplated by the Dictator states.
If the full story of the prolonged negotiations which have been going on could be revealed it would in all probability be shown that there were two obstacles which the British diplomats had to overcome: the first was the distrust arising out of the rebuffs mentioned above, and the second is the fact that the Russian is a notoriously hard bargainer. There might also have been a third, namely, resentment at what appeared in Russian eyes to be an attempt to relegate Russia to the status of an inferior Power. 1t was obvious from the start that the Kremlin would only negotiate on the basis of a completely. recognized equality, and once that particular hurdle was passed ihere then arose the Russian demand that guarantees should be extended to the Baltic who would have none of them, whether they wanted them or not. It has not yet been officially admitted but there are indications to suggest that Great Britain and France have been prepared to meet Russia in this respect, but desire on the other hand to secure from the Soviet pledges for the security of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. The point that the Kremlin made that there were no diplomatic relations between Switzerland and the Netherlands is well taken, but that seems now to be a fault which cannot be remedied without serins repercussions. Even supposing those two countries were to make things easier by extending diplomatic relations to Russia, might it not now be argued that because of the circumstances in which that was being done, those two countries could be accused by both Germany and Italy of departing from their present neutrality, by bringing about a state of affairs in which the perfection of a non-aggression bloc would be possible to their detriment? There was a time when the perpetual neutrality and territorial inviolability of Switzerland were guaranteed by Austria, Great Britain, Portugal, Prussia and Russia, but that disappeared ninety-one years ago, and Switzerland may very well not desire to see it resuscitated in a The difficulties which thus present themselves are not insurmountable, though it is apparent that they will only be solved with the most delicate handling, and for that reason the negotiations may still be expected some little time more. That during security which is thus being offered it in the mutual defence pact is something which it wil not lightly relinquish. Thus, while it is true that Great Britain, and France are buyers in the market, there are benefits to be derived which will induce the seller not to seek to make his price too high, though he is undoubtedly endeavouring to make as considerable a profit as possible. The cohesion of the nations desirous of peace into a close corporation determined to defend it on all possible fronts in Europe, and at all costs will, not only ensure peace,—or at the very least the adequate punishment of those who seek to break it—but will have the effect of strengthening the three great Powers in other parts of the world. That is not to suggest that the Pact will be extended to the Far East; there is reason to believe that it will not, but it is quite clear thatthe strengthening of the positions of France, Great Britain and Russia in Europe must mean an improvement of their situations in the Far East, enabling them all to speak with greater authority than their European preoccupations at present permit. That this would mean a very considerable addition to the factors, making for international stability is one aspect of the matter which supports the desire that agreement shall be reached as quickly as possible, and if, during the present lull in European alarums and excursions, this form of insurance against war can be perfected, the totalitarian states may be brought to a better realization of the enormous risks attendant-upon a continued following of the paths they-have mapped out for themselves.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.