Wu definitely refused all proposals, and a few general remark of his as to the desirability of restoring peace to China at an early date, were con~ veyed by his two visitors as a hint to the Japanese that the Marshal Would accept the role of Pacificator.
'Even, if in the long run, Morshai' Wu does come out in this new role, it would seem that many foreigners mostly those of the "Old China Hand" type—and the Japanese are ascribing rather more importance to [such a move than the facts warrant. Japanese circles consider Wu the only man possible for the job, befeause The "has friendly feelings for us Japanese" and because he is highly, respected among his own country~ men. But it must not be forgotten that Wu made a most tremendous ferash about a dozen oF more years ago, one of the worst crashes that any' public man has ever suffered the political stage of China, and that since then he has been completely. out of politics, occupied with writing [Chinese poetry, the study of Buddhism fand other abstruse subjects.
Much water has flowed down the! Yellow and Yangize rivers _since those days, and the Japanese activities in China during the last 18 months, will hardly have tended to make Wu's sudden conversion to the ]Japanese viewpoint acceptable 10 the! majority of his countrymen. That himself realizes this, seems fairly cleer from the fact that one of his main conditions for working with the Japanese was the complete with Grawal of all Japanese troops in North China. From this demand he has steadily refused to budge.
To "Pacity" Gueritias 11 ig not the defeatist rich merchant] Jand shopkeeper class and the jennetse doree of Shanghai, the treaty ports, and other large cities that Marshal Wu has got to pacify. These classes have long ago thrown in their hand and are going about as usual making money and amusing themselves as happily under Japanese rule as any other, His task as "Pocificator" will bbe with the guerillas and the pessanwho are being "spiritually mobilized" (as the Japanese themselves call 1) by modern, progressive, even Fadical leaders, in all parts of the country. In hoi far a pacifist and pro-Japanese Wu Pei-fu will appeal to such elements today, would seem to be a very moot question indeed.
Then again, Japanese circles talk lightly of Wu's task being simile their own in Manchoukuo. But, in. actual fact, the two problems are vastly different. Inthe first. place North China. is very much larger both in area und in population; in the second place it was the Japanese troops, and the Japanese troops only, who suppressed the banditry in 'Manchoukuo. Yet' the Japanese idea that Wa is to train up his own army for "pacification" purposes. He) ™ad\ may or may not be able to raise an JeMicient army, but at the very least it must take him a year or two. And all that.will then "have happened, will be that there will be a new civil war going on in China between pro-Japanese and an anti-Japanese party, just as there used to be fifteen years ago. And whether, in stich 2 case, Wu's troops could be relied on, is another very doubtful question.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.