The Soviet invasion of Finland marked a turning point in American foreign wartime policy. To put the matter briefly it enabled the Administration policy to dominate Congressional policy instead of being subordinate to it. Ever since 1935, when the first of the neutrality acts was passed, Congressional policy has been based on the assumption that the United States should take no part in other nations' quarrels but devote herself entirely to keeping out of war. In doing this she should leave nothing to chance, but should avoid even moral support of one side or another, should treat all belligerents as equally culpable and place them all under the same impartial ban. Before the neutrality acts were passed the Administration, basing its policy on the implications of the Kel-long Pact, had evolved a theory that the United States had a duty as a great power to place weight behind the country which was the victim of any breach of that pact. The force of world public opinion, including American public opinion, should be mobilized against any aggressor power and if other nations chose to bring in concert measures of economic or even military sanctions against that aggressor then the United States should do nothing to hamper their efforts.
Wo That was the theory upon which the Administration were working when the wave of isolationist sentiment carried the neutrality acts through Congress. Every time the American Administration raised their voice against aggression hereafter, the powers addressed could see behind the figure of the Secretary of State the placard raised by Congress, "Dont worry; we won't let him do anything" Despite this dualism in the directoin of American policy it was possible (provided the nations did not resort to war) for the Administration pursuing íts own conception of what American foreign policy should be to strengthen the forces opposed to aggression and hamper the aggressors. Yet always in the background was that warning or that encouragement. When aggression proceeded to its ultimate extreme of war then the Administration policy would be swamped by Congressional policy and all belligerents would have to be treated alike.
The President was, it was true, able to secure the passage by Congress of a new version of the Neutrality Act which, while maintaining legal impartiality, did not hamper Great Britain's sea-power. After the revised act was passed it was possible for Britain to buy arms in the United States which she could pay for and transport. Germany could legally do the same but was unable to profit owing to Britain's command of the seas. But in making this concession Congress took away with one hand much that it granted with the other. It changed the provisions of a neutrality act which had the effect of presenting Germany with an Atlantic fleet as strong as England's but it substituted another which had the effect of sinking some 80 vessels of the merchant marine which kept England supplied with vital food stuffs and other products from abroad. America's merchant marine was taken out of the combat zone and forbidden to all at belligerent ports. It removed a greater number of vessels from England's vital trade lanes than the combined German mine and submarine campaigns.
American public opinion in the meantime which had been so strongly anti-Nazi that American entry-into the war was discussed not only as a possibility but as a probability at the outbreak of hostilities, began to change. It did not grow more pro-Nazi but it definitely grew more isolationist and to some extent less pro-British. The old nonsense about British Imperialism clashing with the rival power of Germany was brought many's action in the so-called iniquities of the Versailles Treaty. Britain, it was explained, was making war because her self-interest was involved. The self-interest of the United States required that she remain at peace. She should be particularly careful of British propaganda and any statement of British policy which did not coincide with the isolationist view of British motives was regarded as propaganda. In such an atmosphere the ability of the Administration to serve America's true interests, which every informed Government official realized was the triumph of the forces of Democracy against the forces of aggression, was hampered and rendered almost nil.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.