Aprit 18, While some days must elapse before much news will be available concerning the Jand-ing of British forces in Norway, for they have undoubtedly to consolidate their position, and accumulate large stores before actually embarking upon action against the German invaders, attention is being drawn to the Mediterranean. The recent outbursts in the Italian Press against the Allies are all the more significant when it is remembered that the control of the Press in Italy is on 4 par with that which exists in Germany, and the conclusion to be drawn is that Italian newspapers at any rate for the time being reflecting the attitude of the Italian Government, Thus the attempt to belittle. the Allied success against Germany in the North Sea, the insistence upon German victories which exist only in the perfervid minds of Dr. Goebbels and people of that ill, is not now offset by the Italian Press featuring the news of the British landing at Narvik. There is a distinct similarity between Italian and German technique to be noted. Signor Gayda, the mouthpiece of Signor Mussolini, has been responsible for articles attacking Allies, and in his latest outburst against France in fact puts up a plea for Italian lebensraum, not perhaps in so many words but most certainly by implication." Anti-British demonstrations in Milan and Florence, and other examples of what is dubbed in London "Italy's extreme bad will" are all straws in the wind which need the most careful watching. The point is made that all this is part and parcel of the ce-operation of the Rome-Berlin Axis, Italy making this demonstration for the purpose of showing the Allies that they cannot with safety to them= selves withdraw naval forces from the Mediterranean. It must be confessed that the argument does not appear to be a weighty one as the Allies have more than sufficient forces outside the Mediterranean to deal with the remnants of the German fleet, while if it were necessary to strengthen them, the perfection of the blockade in the North Sea and the impossibility of German vessels at present hiding in neutral ports being able to regain their own shores, considerably lightens the task of the naval units watching them, and liberates a very substantial proportion for duties elsewhere.
There is consequently little need for the Allies to reduce their strength in the Mediterranean, and every prospect that it will be maintained at its present level and possibly strengthened should the circumstances warrant it. The point appears to have been missed in most comments on the Mediterranean development that after all the whole thing may arise from purely domestic causes. The understanding between Rome and Berlin has never been too popular with the masses, and in some at least of the most exalted circles. The severe reverses which have been administered to the Germans in the North Sea, the spectacular response to the invasion of Norway by the speedy land~ ing of British troops cannot but make an impression upon the Italian masses. Ultimately the question will be asked as to when ther alliance with Germany was really worth all it was cracked up to be, and the more headway the Allies make against Ger~ many the more important will that aspect of the whole matter become. It may be assumed, therefore, that the present cameign in the controlled Italian press, alleging German victories on the Western Front even, with military correspondents _vieing vith each other in praising German military operations and decrying those of the Allies, has been undertaken for the purpose of allaying such anxiety as must inevitably be created as the news of the German failure becomes better known throughout Italy. The conclusion to be drawn, then, is that the Italian Government is endeavouring to per~ suade its people by means of the Press that the Rome-Berlin Axis is just as strong militarily as ever it was, and that Germany to be relied upon to secure victory. The whole thing may be regarded as an adroit attempt to preserve whatever satisfaction might have existed over the Italian-German alliance. No other explanation for this attempt to mislead the Italian public can possibly hold together, unless the theory advanced by. Havas is accepted that Italy only wishes to create a diversion in the Mediterranean to help Herr Hitler in the north, and thus keep him occupied away from the Balkans, While it is likely that Herr Hitler will find himself greatly preoccupied in Norway for some time to come, the possibilities of his adventuring into the Balkans cannot be ignored. Denmark and Norway may for a while prove an asset to Germany from the point of view of foodstuffs, ete, but in the Jong run they are likely to turn into liabilitics. Then Herr Hitler may be expected to turn his attention to the Balkans, and it is quite on the cards that if Germany does 0, Russid will follow suit. 'The decision will then be left to Rome as to whether Italy. shall acquiesce in the destruction of her sphere of influence in the Balkans, or resort to arms to defend it. That is the choice which' must sooner o later be forced upon Signor Mussolini who must surely realize that all Italy has got out of the Rome-Aerlin Axis is Albania, and a generally unsatisfactory situation in the Mediterranean, Hence this diversion, designed to encourage Herr Hitler to prosecute his northern adventure in the hope that this will divert his atten ti from the Balkans. It is indeed a slight hope. The growing efficiency of the Allied blockade, the tendency of the Balkan states to hang on to their own products as a precaution against the outbreak of hostilities against themselves, must inevitably tend to diminish the amount of supplies Germany can expect, from them. There is then the grave prob! ability that Germany will march into th Balkans in an attempt to secure by force what she is at present unable to purchase. In doing so Germany. will have completely betrayed the Italians who will stand frlendless. "At the most what the Italian Government are doing in connection with this diversion can only help to stave off the evil day in that respect, and while Ti Duce may have every confidence in the strength of the Italian nation, and perhaps unfortunately resort to arms in behalf of Germany, the diplomatic and strategic precaution: which the Allies have made should be ssu glent to cope with the situation thus create.
fo country would more greatly regret war' with Italy than would Great Britain. The worsening of Anglo-Italian relationships during the last few years has been regarded with a great amount of sorrow, Many would Uke to see them improve, but that obviously cannot take place unless Italy is prepared to make a better contribution to amity between the two nations than she is at present offering.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.