The decision to reduce the British, and French garrisons in North China is, in the light of all the circumstances, a sound move, and one which was obviously dictated by the Heel "às one Géritiam jibe would have it, necessities of war. The decision was not
because of.the inability to secure. sufficient recruits in Great Britain to send to France, for the fact is that men are being called up only as quickly as they can be trained with existing facilities, and that for the Allied immediate purposes Great Britain is supplying sufficient strength in manpower, having in those classes which have not yet been called up a wealth of reserve which will make itself felt as the war progresses. Nor is the decision the result of Japanese representations made some time ago, shortly after the outbreak of war, to the effect that the troops of warring nations should be withdrawn from China in order to avoid incidents. It will be remembered that both Great Britain, and France refused to agree to that step then, and the fact is that had the Japanese not made that request the reduction of British and French forces in North China would have been effected much earlier. When the decision of the British Government to reduce the naval patrol on the Yang'ze is taken into consideration, it is obviously clear that it was reached as a result of a desire not to leave too many men, whose services would be of considerable use elsewhere, wasting their time doing protective work which could safely be handled by a much smaller force, and, as in the Yangtze, the British flag will still be kept flying by the minimum of men left there for the purpose of affording whatever protection may be necessary to British interests in Tientsin and Peiping. The withdrawal of these forces, therefore, constitutes no relinquishment of principle, a fact which is clearly demonstrated by the retention of a number of men in the north. To talk of the abandonment of rights either on the part of Great Britain, or of France is, in the circumstances, ludicrous. Those rights would not be abandoned even if temporarily the British ' Government decided to remove every soldier and sailor in China elsewhere for the purposes of war, and to see in this latest development anything of the sort is to see something which simply does not exist.
Of the right of certain Powers to maintain garrisons in North China there cannot be the slightest doubt. That right has never been abrogated, and if for the time being, because of emergencies elsewhere, it is necessary to reduce those garrisons to a mere shadow of their normal selves, that can involve neither questions of principle or of right. There cannot be any question of surrender of British or French rights in China. That has been made quite plain by both governments, emphasized by practically every Power which has important interests in this country, and when the decision is viewed in that light it is clear that it can only be regarded as a very prudent step, and the consolidation of strength rather than 'a continuance of its dissipation. It is a pleasing fact that, on the whole, the relations between Great Britain, and Japan have in recent weeks shown some improvement at Tokyo, and in certain parts of China. That results just as much from a genuine attempt to understand each other's point of view, as it does from the realization in Tokyo that at least one of Japan's more recent friendships has proved itself to be nothing else than a betrayal. On the other hand it is disturbing to note that, according to a telegram appearing in another column, there has been a tightening up of the restrictions enforced at the barriers round the British Concession in Tientsin, and a recrudescence of anti-British sentiment in Peiping. Similar occurrences are from Shantung where attempts to perfect anti-British boycott are still being made, and to a certain extent these reports have the unfortunate effect of offsetting the better impression which has more recently prevailed in Tokyo. It is to be hoped that, within a short while, there will be a similar improvement in the relations, between the Japanese authorities in North China, and third party neutrals, to that which is being shown in Japan itself, and that the day will not be far distant when it will be possible at least to reach a better understanding in the Far East ian has prevailed during the last two years or more. That should not prove insuperably difficult, for the settlement of the Kulangsu incident is ample proof that, given the necessary amount of good will pending issues can be satisfactorily disposed of.
So long as it is realized that none of the Powers interested in China are prepared to relinquish their interests and rights in this country, interests and rights which have been acquired honourably and at the expense of decades of intensive industry, so long will it be possible to arrive at an all round adjustment which, in everyone's interests, should be reached. The preoccupation of Great Britain and France in Europe will not last for ever, nor, while it lasts, will those two Powers be oblivious to developments in the Far East. The reduction of northern garrisons to mere symbolic Strengths, necessitated by the demands of war elsewhere, is not, therefore, to be regarded as anything but a prudent step, which would have been taken following the outbreak of the European war regardless of the situation in the Far East. Just as in the case of the reduction in the strength of the. Yangtze patrol where there has been no abandonment of the British position, so also the maintenance of a small force in Peiping and Tientsin is sufficient indication that there has been, and will be no relinquishment of British rights in northern China. There is no question of allowing the British case in this country to go by default. Those who profess to see in this development an indication that this is probable are taking a short-sighted rather than a long-sighted view of the situation, for the retention of merely a platoon of men between Tientsin and Peiping would be sufficient to emphasize British rights in that part of China. Great Britain, and France stand now, as they have always done, in line with the other great Powers having substantial interests in this country. They, as well as the others, are interested and will continue to be interested in the final settlement of issues which the Sino-Japanese hostilities have created. The British Government has made that quite plain in its various statements that its policies regarding this part of the world have undergone no change. There is, then, to be seen in this decision to reduce the garrisons no surrender of rights, which are in fact still being emphasized, but rather an adaptation to existing circumstances and a demonstration of flexibility fully in keeping with declared intentions, and an insistence upon rights which have still to be vindicated.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.