May 3.
If there is any sign of betterment in the Mediterranean it must surely be the report, confirmed by circles close to the Stale Department in' Washington, that Signor Mussolini has assured Ins. Wiliam Phillips, U. Ambassador to Italy, that he does not intend modify Italian status os a non-belligerent for the time being. The announced decision of the British Government 0 divert British Shipping from the Mediterranean can be taken either as a. wise. precautionary step Beainst being caught unawares, of a8 8 broad hint to Italy that Britain is by no means falistied by the alliiude of some of the Hatian leaders and the Press. Thus while there is no reason {0 suppose Signor Mussolini is "addicted to the prevarication of Which Herr Hitler is s0 notoriously guilty, has nevertheless {o be Yemembered. that, dictators take their decisions swiftly. It may accepted that Signor Mussolini means what he told the American Ambassador, but That by no means shuts out the possibility that at some fulure date he may. suddenly decide to. throw in his lot with Germany, fud unless the Brilish took such a step they have taken, there was a. possibility that an imposing' quantity. of British shipping might be caught unawares and destroyed before the convoy system could be brought into operation. In the circumstances nothing could be more advisable than to reduce the number of British mercantile vessels in the Mediterranean tothe minimum. That. this will involve British shippers in very large extra expense can readily be seen, but. times like these it i better t0 be safe. than sorry, even if the safely has to be purchased dearly. Fortunately for the Ales the enemy Submarine campaign against their shipping has been brought {fo complete, and abject failure, and days now pass without any losses reported either by 'U-boat by mines, while the shipping fo routes. round the Cape of Goat Hope should permit it to carry on its activities comparatively without danger from any Italian action in the event of the country entering the war.
A significant passage occurs in a Havas message from Washington to the effect that Signor Mussolini's decision was, amongst other things, due to the fact that Italy is not yet prepared, both from a military and psychological point of view, to enter the conflict on Germany's side. The impression is gaining ground that, while the Mahan people would undoubtedly follow whatever ead Il Duce gives, they are still reluctant enter into a conflict with the Allies. 'This is not to say that they are in any way pro-Allies, but rather that they are not pro-German, for it will be remembered that con: stantly, since the Rome-Berlin Axis was' formed, reports have been current of the popular dislike in Italy of the union with Germany. That Germany is applying enormous pressure upon Italy may be taken for granted, and is endeavouring to show the Italian Government that the German air force is superior to the Allied navies in the North Sea and along the Norwegian coast. 'That has not yet been clearly demonstrated, and even if it should be, it is only because of the fact that British' fighter aeroplanes cannot be used fully because of the long distances to be covered, and their inability to carry enough {uel to cross over to Norway, fight an action, and return to their home bases. It is consequently apparent to the world at large, and also to Signor Mussolini, that the Germans will have to make a much more imposing showing than they have up to the present to prove the superiority of their air force, for in other theatres of war nothing of the' sort has been shown to exist, the Allies being well able to give a good account of themselves. These factors would seem to be having their influence upon the Italian leader, for he docs not yet appear to be convinced of the German claims, That would account for his sticking to his present equivocal attitude, though at the same time he is affording Herr Hitler moral assistance by means of demonstrations aiming at proving the solidarity of the Rome-Berlin Axis. To that Axis Signor Mussolini has been far more loyal than has his opposite number in Berlin, and that fact too may not be without some influence upon the present situation, The manner in which Herr Hitler has in turn flirted with Soviet Russia, and Italy is also something which has to be taken into account by. the Italians, At the commencement of the war all German affection went to Moscow, the Rome-Berlin Axis being in existence, Which was all that could be said about it. Russia proving a disappointment, he wayward attentions of Herr Hitler have again returned to Rome, and while for purposes of his dwn policy Signor Mussolini must seek to create the impression that com~ plete trust exists between the two gover ments, he is unlikely to commit himself too definitely until he is more certain than he possibly can be at the moment of the Reich's loyalty to the Axis. There is, it is plain to see, every reason why Signor Mussolini should move warily, and from that point of view there may be reason for believing his statement that there will be no modification of Italy's status in the near future, That does not, however, mean that when a change does come about the Allies are likely to have much preliminary notice and common prudence necessitates that every disposition possible should be mace against the possibility of the situation deteriorating so grievously that war in the Mediterranean becomes inevitable. It is perfectly understandable that Irritation should be displayed. in Taly over the British decision, but only if I Duce himself wishes should it lead to any change in British relations with Italy or in Britain's attitude towards questions of common. {terest (0 both countries. The situation in fine is that Great Britain regards the behaviour of certain Mahan leaders and the Ualian Press us definitely threatening war. It has made several blunt representations to Rome on the subject, which have failed to bring about any real' improvement, and the Malians cannot now, complain if Great Britain, and ultimately her Ally take all the necessary steps to protect their position in the event of I] Duco deciding to enter into the war on the side of Germany. They most certainly do not intend to allow themselves to be taken by surprise, and cannot, therefore, neglect any precautions against further trouble,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.