"Although the Japanese fleet and air force are intact, the land forces are insufficient to support and consolidate a gigantic southward expansion. According to conservative estimates of neutral military and naval authorities the Japanese army in China has lost in killed, died of disease erd po dscbted over 1,100,000 men. In addition, they have bogged down in China an army of 1250000 men, not counting their divisions in Manchuria, facing the Russians. It is the consensus of e pert military opinion that the law of diminishing returns is operating in Japan against the creation of fresh formations for new adventures, and the logical step under the circumstances would be for the Japanese to withdraw the bulk of their troops and transports from China.
"For nearly six months China has repeatedly been the recipient of peace offers from Japan on an increasingly favourable basis. The Japanese recognize that there is no hope of eliminating the Chinese forces for a long time to come. On the other hand, time presses, and their advance southward ought no longer to be postponed. Why not then make peace with China so that their troops could be released for the Southern Pacific?
If their Singapore venture succeeds, with the limitless resources of oil, rubber, tin, rice and cotton from the new colonies, and with the Burma Road cut off, China could be strangled at leisure. They could well afford to give China liberal terms now, as, after the fall of Singapore, all agreements with China would automatically go by the board.
"This reasoning is perfectly sound, but also so sound that the Chinese can see it too. Withdrawal of the main Japanese forces would give us temporary relief, but the fall of Singapore would be disastrous for us as for Britain, and perhaps ultimately for the United States. Peace with Japan now would only be a tempora ary armistice with all the advantage accruing to Japan, and. as the Sino-Japanese conflict is a part of the ge eral struggle, enduring peace can only come as part of a general world settlement. Therefore, we must continue our fight, but henceforth we fight not only fo maintain our pos tions but to bring increased pressure so that the enemy cannot withdraw his troops for his southward expansion.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.