Shortly before the fall of Bardia in Libya Marshal Graziani sought to excuse his failure to hold the British offensive in a report to Mussolini, which, according io the American news magazine "Time," is to military historians an amazing mixture of accusation, frankness and bombast. It will be remem bered that long before the British and their Allies opened what is now their most famous offensive, Graziani had been imploring Mussolini for reinforcements in men and material, fully realizing the enormousness of the task which was before him. To these appeals Mussolini turned a deaf ear. The desire to secure a "prestige victory" over Greece induced him to neglect the Italian forces in Libya, and Graziani was left to his own devices, and practically forsaken. Recounting what led to the siege of Bardia the Marshal neatly places responsibility on Rome for what happened, laying the blame for his defeat upon lack of motor transport and motor power: "For the purpose of economizing transportation some units covered hundreds of kilometres on foot." If that is so then the feat of the troops of the non-stop Caesar in getting away from the advancing British in the numbers they did is indeed remarkable.
By implication Graziani criticized the much vaunted Italian air force. With'its home bases much nearer to the scene of action than were Britain's this arm was admittedly overwhelmed by the R.AF. when the attack began. The Italian air fleet was bombed in its bases as far west as Castel Benito and Tripoli, and in effect was so damaged that it practically did not get off the ground. Another cause contributing to his initial defeat was the quick collapse and capture of the ist and 2nd Libyan Divisions suggesting that there was disaffection amongst the Askari troops. The men who did appear to stand up for a time were, to quote Graziani's own words, the *iron-like" January Third Black-shirt Division which "valorously resisted for two days" at Sidi Barrani. The Marshal in what appears to be a piece of gentle sarcasm apparently thinks a stand of two days highly creditable to the Blackshirts, who have fought much more stubbornly in Greece.
That the British Command has thoroughly learned all the lessons of the lightning campaign in the Low Countries is revealed in a further quotation from Graziani's report, for he shows that when the British struck they struck hard and quickly:—
"Against strong-holds occupied by our troops in flat desert terrain and without any possibility of tactic: he wrote, "the enemy had an opportunity of ploying masses of armoured units, armoured cars, medium and heavy tanks supported by mobile artillery and with the effective ce-operation of air forces. The brief preparation generally was entrusted to artillery' and aviation, "As soon as the massacring air bombardment ceased, armoured units struck from every direction against our troops. Thus, despite the fiercest resistance, our strongholds within a few hours were taken one by one.
"The esse reason for the enemy's lightning-like initial success must be attributed to the crushing superiority of the enemy's armoured units....
"If today—twelve days from the beginning of the offensive—British armoured divisions mark time before the port of Bardia, this is exclusively due to the bravery of the soldiers of Italy of the land and air, who know how bravely to oppose the enemy by dying without sparing themselves, "Once again I confirm in categoric manner that all down here have done their duty to the limits possible, If the number of those who had the misfortune to fall prisoner is high, this must not make you doubt their valour—they resisted with a will to resist until the very end...."
The Marshal clearly indicts Mussolini for neglecting the Italian forces in Libya. The superiority which they undoubtedly had some months ago when Graziani made his advance into Egypt, had completely disappeared owing to the complete failure of Mussolini to respond to the frantic demands of his commander-in-chief. This prevented him from adventuring further in Egypt and gave the British time to build up their strength to all round crushing superiority. In the light of this the article of Col. Principini Italian Military and Air Attache in China in the Japanese newspaper "Tairiku Shimpo" reads somewhat strangely. Col. Principini writing under the heading "Mediterranean under Italian Command," declares in brief that the success of Graziani's onslaught on the Suez Canal has caused British forces to adopt an unsuccessful counter-attack against the Italians. Owing to stiff resistance by the Italians, he continues, neither Sidi Bar-rani, nor Bardia, nor Tobruk is likely to fall into the hands of the British. In answer to this sort of rubbish it is merely necessary to point out that British forces and their Allies have taken all these places and are well on the road to Tripolitania.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.