I should like to state here, parenthetically but emphatically, that Herr Hitlers constant repetition of his desire for good relations with Great Britain was undoubtedly a sincere conviction, He will prove in the future a fascinating study for the historian and the biographer with psychological leanings. Widely different explanations will be propounded, and it would.be out of place and time to comment at any length in this despatch on this aspect of Herr Hitler's and character, But he combined, as I fancy many Germans do, admiration for the British race with envy of their achievements and hatred of their opposition to Germany's excessive aspirations. It is no exaggeration to say that he assiduously courted Great Britain, both as representing the aristocracy and most successful of the Nordic races, and as constituting the only seriously dangerous obstacle to his own far-reaching plan of German domination in Europe. This is evident in Mein Kampf, and, in spite of what he regarded as the constant rebuffs which he received from the British side, he persisted in his endeavours up to the last moment. Geniuses are strange creatures, and Herr Hitler, among other paradoxes, is a mixture of longheaded calculation and violent and arrogant impulse provoked by resentment, The former drove him to seek Britain's friendship and the latter finally into war with her. Moreover, he believes his resentment to be entirely justified. He failed to realize why his military-cum-police tyranny should be repugnant to British ideals of individual and motional freedom and liberty, or why he should not be allowed a free hand in Central and Eastern Europe to subjugate smaller and, as he regards them, inferior peoples to superior German rule and culture. He believed he could buy British acquiescence in his own far-reaching schemes by offers of alliance with and guarantees for the British Empire. Such acquiescence was indispensable to the success of his ambitions and he worked unceasingly to.secure it. His great mistake was his complete failure to understand the inherent British sense of morality, humanity and freedom.
It must be mentioned here that the concluding passage of the Chancellors reply to His Majesty's Government had contained 2 statement to the effect that the German Government would immediately draw up proposals for a solution of the Polish question which it would, if possible, place at the disposal of the British Government before the arrival of the Polish negotiator. I had at once telegraphed to your Lordship the text of the German note, and in the early hours of the morning of August 30, (4 am.) I had already conveyed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs your interim reply, to the effect that it would be carefully considered, but observing that it would be unreasonable to expect that His Majesty's Government could produce a Polish representative at Berlin within twenty-four hours, and that the German Government must not count on this.
Later in the course of the day, I received three messages for communication to the German Government. The first was a personal one from the Prime Munister to the Chancellor notifying the latter of the representations made to Warsaw in regard to the avoidance of frontier incidents, and begging the German Government to take similar precautions. (I transmitted this in the afternoon to its destination in a personal letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs). The second similarly notified the German Government of our counsels of restraint io Poland and asked for reciprocal tion on Germany's part. The third pointed out that the demand that a Polish Representative with full powers must come to Poland to receive the German' proposals was unreasonable and suggested that the German Government should follow the normal procedure of inviting the Polish Ambassador to call and of banding him the German proposals for transmission to Warsaw with a view to arrangements being made for the conduct of negotiations. This last communication also reminded the German Government that it had promised to communicate its detailed proposals to His Majesty's Government, who undertook, if they offered a reasonable basis, to do their best in Warsaw to facilitate negotiation: The good intentions of His Majesty Government were, in fact, patently [clear and had Herr Hitler honestly desired or preferred a pacific settlement all the arrangements to that end seemed to be in full swing.
Thad arranged to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs at 11.30 p.m. 1o make these communications to him Shortly before the appointed time I received in code the considered reply of His Majesty's Government to the German Note of August 29. I was accordingly obliged to ask that my meeting with Herr von Ribbentrop should be postponed for half an hour, in order to give me the time ti have this last message deciphered In the final passages of that communication His Majesty's Government, while fully recognizing the meed for speed in the initiation of discussions, urged that during the negotiations no aggressive military operations should take place on either side. They further expressed their confidence that they could secure such an undertaking from the Polish Government, if the German Government would give similar assurance They also suggested a temporary modus vivendi at Danzig, such as would obviate the risk of incidents which might render German-Polish relations still more difficult.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.