The Archive · 1939

THE U.S. PROTEST

Why there should have been painful surprise felt in London over the representations made by the United States on the subject of the extension of the blockade to German exports in neutral bottoms it is not easy to understand, for it will be remembered that when on March 11, 1915, a British Order-in-Council was promulgated under which all goods with enemy destination, or of enemy origin became liable to seizure, Washington took precisely the same step. In its note the United States Government makes perfectly proper representations, going on record as not approving of the decision of the Allies, and reserving all its rights under international law. It is couched in mild terms considering all the circumstances and may be rightly regarded as conciliatory in tone. The American Note of 1915 protested against provisions to "detain and take into port ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership or origin," as constituting "a practical assertion of unlimited belligerent rights over neutral commerce within the whole European area." There is nothing so strong as that in the Note under review. The situation which the Allies find themselves placed by the hopelessly illegal manner in which the Reich is prosecuting its unrestricted submarine, and mine warfare has necessitated the adoption of the most effective methods of reprisal, and the following of the precedent established in 1915 is the only really logical way of retaliation, It is inevitable that neutrals should suffer as a result. They are already suffering from the manner in which Germany seeks to maintain a blockade of Great Britain, in indiscriminate sinking of neutral shipping. There is a peculiar significance in the passage in the American- Note which says "Apart from principles of international law whose maintenance in full integrity cannot be emphasized too much, since at present the tendency not to recognize right in international relations, menaces the security of peaceful nations," etc. There is more than a tendency on the part of Germany not to recognize right in international relations, and it may with safety be said that since the commencement of the war the Reich has not hesitated to break all and any international laws when it has suited its purpose to do so. The suggestion contained in the American Note that the Allies should handicap themselves by a scrupulous regard for that law which is continually breached by the Nazis, stands on about a par with the contention that a man attacked by a tough armed with a &nuckle-duster should pay most tender respect to the Marquis of Queensberry's rules.

The Allies do not propose to sink neutral shipping in the manner the Reich is doing. They do propose, however, to exercise the right of visit, and search as developed during the last war, to bring a complete stop to all forms of German trade as part of the general system of blockade. It involves neutral shipping in no danger, though it may subject it to some inconvenience and delay. On the subject of the two classifications of trade with which the United States desire to see no interference, namely, those already contracted for prior to the enforcement of the Order-in-Council, and that merchandise supplied by Germany which cannot be easily found in other markets though necessary to American buyers to permit them to continue their legitimate commerce, there is probably some possibility of making such arrangements where the Allies will, not prevent the transportation of essential neutral requirements from Germany, while still delivering a severe blow io Germany's export trade. A compromise in this connection should be possible without unduly depriving the blockade of German exports of the major proportion of its efficiency, and it is along these lines that endeavours may be expected to ensure that the interference with German exports shall do as little harm as possible to neutral interests. That neutrals do have to suffer is one of the unfortunate aspects of war, but there is clearly no equity in the argument that while Germany is allowed to wreak all sorts of harm on neutral shipping without protest, the Allies in following perfectly legal procedure should be criticized, or that attempts should be made to prevent them following proper courses in the prosecution of their resistance against German attacks on the peace.of the world. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that in this present struggle the Allies are fighting the cause of every neutral in the world, and more particularly the cause of every one of the smaller countries.

In any consideration of this question it has to be remembered that every war has brought about a modification of preconceived ideas of how warfare should be conducted. Thus the doctrine of "continuous voyage" was enunciated by the U. S. Prize Courts in the course of the Civil War. It was sought at the commencement of the last war to enforce a blockade under the Declaration of London, which proved a mere filigree, and entirely inapplicable to the intricacies of naval warfare. The attempt to reduce prize law to a code made the British blockade of Germany futile from August, 1914, to March, 1915. Under its rules, food, cotton and all conditional contraband could not be touched so long as they were being discharged at a neutral port, and for five months a success sion of ships steamed daily through the Downs, bound for Holland and Scandinavia, laden with food and cotton for Germany. The discovery of the Civil War,—the doctrine of continuous voyage,—formed a precedent

blockade was tightened up with prohibition of German export a system was completed which proved one of the most effective weapons in the hands of the Allies. It is not to be believed that, in such a war as this, where the enemy knows nothing of internation law save how to break it, the Allies should be expected to forego all the advantages which superior naval strength undoubtedly gives them. If such a contention could be upheld for one moment its principal raison d'étre would have completely disappeared and a powerful fleet would be deprived of one of its strongest means of imposing the Allied will upon Germany in the shape of the blockade. That the blockade should be made as effective as possible is an imperative necessity so far as the Allies are concerned, and, while every effort will undoubtedly be made to meet the wishes of the neutral protesting countries, it is obviously unreasonable to expect that whatever compromises may have to be made should be such as completely to nullify the effect of one of the Allies major weapons in this struggle.

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

Your account