It may be that, when the Fascist Grand Council meets on Tuesday, Il Duce will announce Italy's entry into the war. The breaking off by Rome of the Anglo-Italian trade negotiations, on the ground that no useful purpose could be served by continuing them, was at least honest, in comparison with tHp flagrant dishonesty of Der Fuehrer, for iy/yives the Allies clear warning that, despite theft efforts, the situation has worsened, and that Italy may take such decisions in the near future as will rank her alongside her Ally rather more positively than has been the case up to the present. The desire on the part of the Allies not to have to fight Italy is evidenced by the proposal io make the blockade less stringent against her. That proposal occasioned some annie for it might very well have permitted Italy to continue as a channel through which Germany might receive a certain amount of contraband, and in making such a proposal the Allies were in fact modifying the efficacy of their blockade. With Italy definitely in the war she will be subjected to precisely the same degree of blockade as has been imposed upon Germany and the closing of this avenue of supply to th latter will in effect amount to the further blockage of one of the various leaks in the blockade system, the existence of which has been notorious. The result from that point of view will be that the German-Italian alliance will have to depend upon the Balkans and Russia as their only remaining sources of supply. Russia, it is known, has definitely not come up to German expectations, while, if the Balkans cannot provide Germany with adequate supplies, how can it possibly be expected that they would be able to render much assistance to Italy? Regrettable as Italy's entry into the war would be, departure from her present ambiguous attitude will not be without its benefits for the Allies. The situation which will be brought about will be no different from what they expected it would be when they declared war on Germany for her invasion of Poland. In a state of non-belligerency Italy has been able to render some economic assistance to her ally. The extension of the blockade to her, and the expansion of her own needs by reason of war, will no longer permit her to carry on in the same way. Thus the imperative: demands which will be made upon the Italian railway system will mitigate against the full receipt of those rail-borne coal supplies upon which Italy has now to depend for her industries, She will be thrown upon her own resources in other directions also, and it is only by a short sharp war, lasting perhaps no more than a few weeks that Signor Mussolini can hope to secure any benefits, and then only if he and Herr Hitler gain the day. There is little or nothing in the belief that Italian entry into the war will have much effect upon the fighting in northern France. Ever since the commencement of hostilities the French have made adequate dispositions to meet the possibility of an Italian invasion in the south, and the transport of reinforcements from the north to the south, except for some unforeseen circumstance, would not seem to be necessary.
There is now very little reason to believe that Signor Mussolini will keep out of this war That there are powerful influences in Rome in favour of Italy continuing to remain peaceful is undoubted, but the manner in which the controlled Italian Press has sought to inflame the masses in favour of war, clearly indicates what the rulers have in mind. It would con-
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