If the reports concerning the alleged departure of German vessels from various European and South American ports are correct, an attempt on a large scale to run the Allied blockade is being made. According to the information available five ships have left Vigo in Spain in an attempt to reach German ports. They are the Wangoni, 7,843 tons, the Wahehe, 4,709 tons, the Orizaba, 4,954 tons, the Rostok, 12,542 tons, and the Morea, 1,927 tons. From Brazilian ports the Wakama, 9,800 tons, the Wolfsburg, 6,201 tons, Lo Coruna, 7,414 tons land the Koenigsberg, 6,466 tons are also reported to have left the ports in which they were seeking refuge, also in an attempt to get through the Allied blockade. The total tonnage on the high seas, therefore, belong-ling to Germany is in the neighbourhood of 57,000, and if the value of the cargo alleged to be on board the Wakama is to be taken as a criterion,—and that is reported to be worth £250,000,—the sum total of goods said to be speeding towards Germany should be somewhere in the neighbourhood of £1,300,- 000. The figure is only approximate and is based upon the ratio of the tonnages of the various vessels. Nevertheless it is clear that an important attempt is being made to break through the Allied blockade and get into Germany those materials of which she may not yet be in urgent need, but which itis expected she will be as the economic pressure which the Allies are now exerting becomes more potent with the passage of time. It is impossible to form an idea of the value of the vessels engaged in this interesting attempt, but it must assuredly be a very substantial sum, giving rise to speculation as to why the Reich should run the risks which such an attempt.as this must necessarily entail. The policy which the Germans have followed up to the present is that when any of their vessels are intercepted by Allied war craft in their attempt to reach German ports, they shall be immediately scuttled, and, while it may very well be that some of the ships will succeed in passing through the Allied cordon, the destruction of a comparatively small proportion of their number will in itself prove a serious blow to the German mercantile marine which, as the months pass, is becoming increasingly weaker.
Apart from the urgent desire for as much raw material, etc., as possible, Germany is faced with the fact that the payment of various dues in the ports where these ships have sought refuge, the maintenance of the vessels themselves and their crews represents a very considerable drain on the resources in exchange which Germany is known to have abroad. Most of the foreign currency of which Germany is possessed abroad is needed for the purpose of the extensive propaganda campaign which is being conducted, and as German resources in this respect are known not to be very great, so long as propaganda is considered more important in winning the war than the preservation of the German mercantile marine, the policy of endeavouring to run the blockade and of scut-fling when in danger of capture undoubtedly commends itself to the Reich. As with the inglorious scuttling of the Admiral Graf Spee this policy has been regarded in some quarters as an indication that Germany, realizing that it cannot win the war, desires io leave gs few prizes as possible for the reward of the victors. It is a good argument as far as it goes, but the other side of the shield has also to be taken into consideration. The policy of scuttle in the last war was one of final desperation. It need not be in this instance. The Reich could with every appearance of logic decide that it has very &ood chances of victory, and rather than let these ships fall into the hands of the Allies for their temporary benefit, it would be better to destroy them if necessary, always hoping to reimburse itself, if victorious, from the mercantile fleets of the Allies. By such a means the Nazi leaders might hope as one of the fruits of victory to make their country the largest ocean carrying nation in the world, and that especially in view of the studied destruction of the shipping of neutral powers for which there cannot be the slightest justification.
It is a gambler's policy it must be admitted, but there is more to it than that. German leaders have not hesitated to assure the world that victory will be theirs, but that if it is not, in their defeat they will take the rest of Europe to destruction with them. Viewed in that light the attempt to get these ten German vessels home secures its proper perspective. Each one of these ships which reaches a German port represents in the circumstances clear profit. Por those which do not prove successful and are scuttled it is hoped to obtain recompense when peace terms come to be considered, and if that is not possible it is hoped that with the destruction of all, and any shipping, which the German navy or air arm may be able to reach, the Allies may be deprived of some of the fruits of their victory. Whatever may be the opinion of the world as to the legality of the methods which Germany pursues, there can be no gainsaying the fact that the game of beggar-my-neighbour is in wartime strategically sound, but it throws a striking light upon the mentality of the Nazi leaders and their complete irresponsibility. They appear to be following this line of reasoning: "We hope to win, but if we don't we are determined that our enemy's victory shall be a fruitless one, even though it deprives us of the chance of ample spoils in the event of our own success." The policy of run and scuttle, combined with the ruthless warfare on Allied and neutral shipping is, therefore, indicative of no real faith regarding the possibilities of a German victory, and is, at the same time, an insurance against the Allies being able to secure compensation from a non-existent German mercantile fleet. Germany needs, and will need all the supplies she can possibly get, will run any risk in an endeavour to secure them, and if the price it has to pay is exorbitant, it will nevertheless have to be paid. No better evidence could possibly be available to prove how completely the Allied blockade is obtaining a stranglehold upon German economic life. The price to secure even the slightest relaxation is apparently not too big, even if it involves the loss of a large portion of the balance of the German mercantile marine, and the Reich will apparently be satisfied if only a small proportion of these ten vessels succeed in running the Allied blockade, and the rest find a haven at the bottom of the sea.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.